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Abstract
This Article frames the precautionary principle as an inner limit to the EU institutions’ broad discre-
tion in the field of EU risk regulation, contextualizing recourse to the principle against the more
encompassing backdrop of socially acceptable risk approaches. On these grounds, it inquires to what
extent the precautionary principle may be successfully invoked in challenges to acts which are deemed
insufficiently protective. The opening sections set the ground for the analysis. The third section ana-
lyzes challenges to regulatory acts, arguing that the Court has followed a quantitative threshold
approach. This is legally tenable and appropriate; however, it cannot do justice to the true nature
of the precautionary principle. The following sections analyze cases involving legislative acts. This
includes an in-depth examination of the recent Blaise case, which has put judicial review of compliance
with the precautionary principle under the spotlight. Against this overall background, this Article con-
cludes that judicial review can hardly do justice to the precautionary principle, as applicable to the risk
management process and underpinning EU legislative frameworks. It will ultimately rest on EU risk
managers and EU legislators to ensure that the principle is applied and that its overarching goals are
pursued.
Keywords Precautionary Principle; risk regulation; judicial review; Court of Justice of the European Union; administrative
discretion; pesticides; PPP Regulation; Blaise; genetically modified organisms; Confédération Paysanne
A. Introduction
This Article frames the precautionary principle as an inner limit to the EU institutions’
broad discretion in the field of EU risk regulation, contextualizing recourse to the principle
against the more encompassing backdrop of socially acceptable risk approaches. On these
grounds, it inquires to what extent a breach of the precautionary principle may be success-
fully invoked in challenges to regulatory and legislative acts which are deemed insufficiently
protective.
The opening sections set the grounds for the analysis, providing an overview of the precau-
tionary principle in the context of EU risk regulation and EU judicial review. The third section
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analyzes judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle in challenges to regu-
latory acts. Drawing on an analysis of Paraquat1 and France v. Commission,2 this Article
argues that the Court of Justice of the European Union has followed a “quantitative threshold”
approach. This is both legally tenable and appropriate. By employing this approach, the Court
has drawn some boundaries between judicial review of compliance with the precautionary
principle, on the one hand, and an acknowledgment of the risk manager’s discretion in com-
plying with the precautionary principle, on the other hand. However, this approach cannot do
justice to the true nature of the principle. Normative and political contestation as to whether
uncertain risks are socially acceptable and worth running lies at the heart of precautionary
principle; yet, the Court will refrain from engaging with this qualitative aspect. This is the
slippery slope of the precautionary principle that the Court has carefully, and understandably,
avoided.
The fourth and fifth sections analyze cases where the precautionary principle has been used
as a sword3 in challenges involving legislative acts. The fourth section provides an overview of
Monsanto Italia4 and Confédération Paysanne.5 The fifth section conducts an in-depth exami-
nation of the recent Blaise6 case, which has put judicial review of compliance with the precau-
tionary principle under the spotlight. This Article finds that these cases have yielded mixed
results. The Court may find that a legislative act is in breach of the precautionary principle
where it has robust legal elements to draw this conclusion. However, it has also suggested that
issues pertaining to procedural regulatory arrangements, the scope of risk assessment, or the
distribution of regulatory authority should primarily be dealt with by the EU legislator and
solved in the political arena. Further, regulatory implementation issues might be more salient
than legal matters in cases involving legislative frameworks. This scenario is perfectly exem-
plified by the highly complex implementation matters at stake in Blaise. Where this occurs, a
challenge on the basis of the precautionary principle will be useless. Regulatory implementa-
tion is neither a matter of law, nor for the Court to review.
Against this overall background, the Article concludes that judicial review can hardly do justice
to the precautionary principle, as applicable to the risk management process and underpinning
EU legislative frameworks. The difficulties that the Court faces in its legal examination are inher-
ent to the nature of the principle. On these grounds, it will rest on EU risk managers and EU
legislators to ensure that the precautionary principle is applied and that its overarching goals
are pursued.
B. The Precautionary Principle and EU Risk Regulation
The precautionary principle and its role, overarching tenets, and implications has intrigued aca-
demic commentators for years.7 Its application to risk management and societal and political
1CJEU Case T-229/04, Sweden v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:217 (July 11, 2007), [hereafter Paraquat].
2CJEU, Case T-257/07, France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:444 (Sept. 9, 2011), See also CJEU, Case C-601/11 P, France
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2013:465 (July 11, 2013), (wherein the party appealed, though unsuccessfully).
3The reference to the use of the precautionary principle as a “shield” and a “sword” is borrowed from Joanne Scott & Ellen
Vos, The Juridification of Uncertainty: Observations on the Ambivalence of the Precautionary Principle Within the EU and the
WTO, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 253 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002).
4CJEU, Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia and others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:431 (Sept. 9, 2003), [hereafter Monsanto
Italia].
5CJEU, Case C-528/16, Confédération Paysanne and others v. Premier Ministre and Ministre de l’Agriculture, de
l’Agroalimentaire et de la Forêt, ECLI:EU:C:2018:583 (July 25, 2018), [hereafter Confédération Paysanne].
6CJEU, Case C-616/17, Blaise and others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:800 (Oct. 1, 2019).
7In EU law, see, Marjolein Van Asselt & Ellen Vos, The Precautionary Principle and the Uncertainty Paradox, 9 J. OF RISK
RES. 313 (2006); Maria Lee, Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 242 (2009);
ELLEN VOS &MICHELLE EVERSON, UNCERTAIN RISKS REGULATED (2012); Elizabeth Fisher, Framing Risk Regulation: A Critical
Reflection, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 125 (2013); Christopher Anderson, Contrasting Models of EU Administration in Judicial Review
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controversies surrounding the precautionary nature of risk regulation have been under the spot-
light for a long time.8 Yet, legal analysis still struggles to capture what has been defined as the
“juridification of uncertainty.”9
Under EU law the precautionary principle is enshrined, yet not defined, in the TFEU.10 Several
references to the principle that a high level of public health and environmental protection shall be
pursued in the Union may also be identified therein.11 All legislative frameworks in the field of EU
risk regulation are underpinned by the precautionary principle,12 yet the only definition is found
in Article 7(1) of the General Food Law. This Article stipulates that,
[I]n specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available information, the possibility
of harmful effects on health is identified but scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk man-
agement measures necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the [Union]
may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a comprehensive risk assessment.13
A more encompassing and more detailed definition is provided for under the 2001
Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle. The Communication draws a dis-
tinction between the two limbs of the principle:14 the decision whether to act in the face of persist-
ing uncertainty, and the decision of how to act, weighing and balancing all relevant interests at
stake, considering alternative regulatory options and enacting specific risk management measures.
In respect of the whether to act limb, the 2001 Communication maintains that the precautionary
of EU Risk Regulation, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 424 (2014); MARIA WEIMER & ANNIEK DE RUIJTER, REGULATING RISKS IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION (2019). In U.S. law, see, SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES (2005); CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005). In the
WTO context, see, JOANNE SCOTT, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES: A
COMMENTARY (2009); Christian Joerges & Alexia Herwig, The Precautionary Principle in Conflicts Law Perspective, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 3 (Geert Van Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2013).
From the broader public international law perspective, see JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK REGULATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
8For an overview of risk management in the highly controversial field of genetically engineered organisms, see MARIA
WEIMER, RISK REGULATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET: LESSONS FROM AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (2019), and
Giulia Claudia Leonelli, The Perfect Storm: GMO Governance and the EU Technocratic Turn, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 364 (Marjan Peeters & Mariolina Eliantonio eds., 2020). On the glyphosate controversy,
see Giulia Claudia Leonelli, The Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of EU Risk Regulation, 25
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 582 (2018).
9See Scott & Vos, supra note 3.
10Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 191(2), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C115)
47 [hereafter TFEU].
11References to the principle that a high level of public health and environmental protection shall be ensured are ubiquitous
in the Treaties, starting from TFEU art. 114(3) & 191(2).
12In legislative acts, see Commission Regulation 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and
Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority, and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of
Food Safety, 2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, recital (21), arts. 6(3), 7(1) [hereinafter The General Food Law]; Directive 2001/18/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically
Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, O.J. 2001 (L 106) 1 recital (8), arts. 1(1), 4(1) [hereinafter
Deliberate Release Directive]; the cross-references to the General Food Law, including the notion of the precautionary principle
enshrined therein, in art. 7(1) of Commission Regulation 1829/2003 of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Foods
2003 O.J. (L 268) 1 art. 7(1) [hereinafter GM Food and Feed Regulation]; Commission Regulation 1107/2009/EC of 21
October 2009 Concerning the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market and Repealing Council Directives 79/117/
EEC and 91/414/EEC, 2009 O.J. (L 309) 1 recital (8), arts. 1(4), 13(2) [hereinafter PPP Regulation];Commission Regulation
1907/2006 of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH) and Establishing a European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and Amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing
Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and
Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 recitals (9), (69), art. 1(3).
13See GM Food and Feed Regulation art. 7(1) (referencing General Food Law).
14Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, at 12, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000).
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principle may apply where “scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain and
where there are indications that the possible effects on the environment or human, animal or plant
health may be potentially dangerous and inconsistent with the chosen level of protection.”15
This definition is broader and arguably more accurate than the one found in the General Food
Law. First, it can encompass all forms of scientific uncertainty. In risk regulation, a “hazard” is
defined as a biological, chemical, or physical agent with the potential to cause adverse effects.16 A
“risk,” on the other hand, is defined as the probability of occurrence of adverse effects and their
severity, as resulting from exposure to a hazard.17 Uncertainties surface at each and every stage of
the technical-scientific evaluation (risk assessment) process, and can be categorised as “hazard-
related,” “risk-related,” and “methodological” uncertainties.18
The typical precautionary principle scenario involves absence of conclusive scientific proof of
specific adverse effects in circumstances where a causal link between the potentially hazardous
characteristics of a product or process and adverse effects cannot be positively established; in other
words, science can neither confirm nor exclude the possibility of adverse effects. These cases
involve hazard-related uncertainties.19 However, scientific uncertainty may also relate to expo-
sures and the evaluation and characterization of relevant risks. Questions relating to exposures
in real life conditions or multiple exposures may be at stake. Further, in the face of data gaps
or diverging results in different scientific studies, the available evidence may be considered insuf-
ficient for the purposes of characterizing complex risks and ascertaining whether they meet the
intended level of protection.20 These are forms of risk-related uncertainty. Finally, the application
of different models and methods, yielding different results, may come into play. This generates
methodological uncertainties, insofar as reliance on different data will result in different risk man-
agement measures.21 Quite clearly, the broad definition enshrined in the 2001 Communication
may encompass within its scope all these forms of uncertainty.
Second, the definition in the 2001 Communication highlights the connection between the
determination of the intended level of protection, the identification of the threshold of acceptable
risk, and recourse to the precautionary principle in a very clear way. The precautionary principle
applies where, in the face of uncertainty, a risk may be too high to comply with the level of pro-
tection set by the risk manager. Thus, the decision on whether to act “is a function of the risk level
that is acceptable to the society on which the risk is imposed.” 22 This is explicitly acknowledged to
be “an eminently political decision.”23
The case law of the Court has generally drawn on these definitions in cases where the precau-
tionary principle is at stake.24 However, as illustrated in the following sections, the Court’s case law
15Id. at 7, 12.
16Id. at 28 annex III.
17Id.
18For an in depth analysis, see GIULIA CLAUDIA LEONELLI, TRANSNATIONAL NARRATIVES AND REGULATION OF GMO RISKS
(forthcoming 2021); see also Giulia Claudia Leonelli, Acknowledging the Centrality of the Precautionary Principle in Judicial
Review of EU Risk Regulation: Why it Matters, 57 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1773 (2020).
19Prominent examples are genetically engineered organisms, glyphosate’s carcinogenicity, or the uncertain public health
risks posed by residues of hormones—administered for growth promotion purposes—in meat. See LEONELLI, supra note 18.
Hazard-related uncertainties may also emerge at the hazard characterization stage.
20These aspects emerge quite clearly in the field of pesticides; see infra, Section F. See also LEONELLI, supra note 18.
21This is typical of the regulation of chemicals. See, e.g., the analysis in Giulia Claudia Leonelli, The Fine Line Between
Procedural and Substantive Review in Cases Involving Complex Technical-Scientific Evaluations: Bilbaína, 55 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1217 (2018) (providing an annotation of ECJ, Case C-691/15 P, European Commission v. Bilbaína de
Alquitranes SA and others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:882 (Apr. 22, 2020).
22Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 14, at 15.
23Id.
24The case law of the Court mostly relates to challenges against acts which are deemed too restrictive; see infra, the analysis
in Section C. For the first oblique reference to the precautionary principle in the Court’s case law, preceding the adoption of
the Commission Communication, see Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar at paras. 63, 64, Case C-157/96, Ex parte
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in the field of EU risk regulation mostly focuses on the risk manager’s broad margins of discretion.
The notion of administrative discretion, as such and as unqualified by further indications, is unre-
lated to the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle and the pursuit of a high level of
protection.25 In this sense, the acknowledgement of the risk manager’s broad discretion limits the
opportunities to challenge EU acts on the grounds of a breach or misapplication of the precau-
tionary principle.
Against this backdrop, can compliance with the precautionary principle be the object of judicial
review in cases where an act is challenged for being insufficiently protective? If the answer is
affirmative, why and how is this possible? Regulatory theory provides some relevant insights
in this respect. As the following subsection endeavours to show, the precautionary principle
can be framed as an inner limit to the EU institutions’ broad discretion. In fact, regulatory theory
sheds some light on the role of the precautionary principle and its relationship to the notion of
administrative discretion. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the precautionary principle
must be set against the broader picture of socially acceptable risk approaches.26 In other words, the
precautionary principle cannot be analyzed in isolation.
I. Putting the Precautionary Principle Into Context: Socially Acceptable Risk Approaches and
The Question of Administrative Discretion
The interconnections between prudential approaches to risk assessment27 and multiple forms of
scientific uncertainty, on the one hand, and precautionary risk management,28 on the other, are too
often neglected. A prudential approach to risk assessment entails that hazard-related, risk-related,
and methodological uncertainties should be taken into due consideration. Prudential models and
safety factors, which are most likely to over-estimate the relevant risks, should be employed.
Further, risk assessments should be as thorough and all-encompassing as technically possible, with
a view to dispelling persisting uncertainties.29 Framing precautionary risk management in isola-
tion from the notions of uncertainty, scientific complexity, and scientific pluralism has resulted in
the assumption that recourse to the precautionary principle is “non-scientific.” Yet, as this section
illustrates, this is far from being the case.
Further, other legitimate factors (OLFs) and their importance within risk management are
hardly given the attention they deserve in risk regulation theory. These encompass public opinion
and public perception of risk, the availability and effectiveness of risk management measures, and
an evaluation of the advantages, disadvantages, and distributional implications associated with the
National Farmers’ Union and Others (June 2, 2016) (“[W]here there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to
human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those
risks become fully apparent.”); For further elaboration, following the Commission Communication, see CJEU, Case T-13/99,
Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council, ECLI:EU:T:2002:209 (Sept. 11, 2002), paras. 142–146; CJEU, Case T-70/99, Alpharma v.
Council, ECLI:EU:T:2002:210 (Sept. 11, 2002), paras. 153–55; CJEU, Joined Cases T-74, 76, 83, 85, 132, 137 & 141/00,
Artegodan and Others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2002:283 (Nov. 26, 2002), para. 184, [hereinafter Artegodan and Others].
25For in-depth insight on this point, set against the analysis of challenges to acts which are deemed too restrictive, see
Leonelli, Acknowledging the Centrality of the Precautionary Principle in Judicial Review of EU Risk Regulation: Why it
Matters, supra note 18.
26For an overview of socially acceptable risk approaches, see Leonelli, Transnational Narratives and Regulation of GMO
Risks, supra note 18; Leonelli, The Perfect Storm: GMO Governance and the EU Technocratic Turn, supra note 8.
27The risk assessment stage consists of a technical-scientific evaluation of uncertain risks, conducted by experts. For a def-
inition, see General Food Law, supra note 12, at arts. 3(11), 6(2). For references to “prudential” risk assessment, see
Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 14, at 12.
28Risk management consists of the determination of the intended level of protection, setting of the threshold of acceptable
risk, and enactment of risk management measures. For a definition, see General Food Law, supra note 12, at arts. 3(12), 6(3).
29For an in depth analysis of the notion of a “prudential” risk assessment, see Leonelli, Transnational Narratives and
Regulation of GMO Risks, supra note 18.
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decision to run uncertain risks and different regulatory options.30 While OLFs are conceptually
distinguished from the precautionary principle, a close connection exists between the two.
Ultimately, the precautionary principle is embedded in a broader, “socially acceptable risk”
approach to risk governance. Under this ideal model, uncertain risks should only be run where
they are deemed socially acceptable, taking into due account scientific uncertainty, the intended
level of protection, the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle, and any relevant OLFs.31
Considerations as to the specific—public health and environmental—values at stake and the per-
vasiveness and irreversibility of any potential adverse effects pertain to the application of the pre-
cautionary principle. However, all elements—scientific uncertainty, intended level of protection,
precautionary principle, and OLFs—are set along a continuum under iterative,32 socially accept-
able risk approaches.
This does not mean that reliance on socially acceptable risk approaches will always result in the
pursuit of a zero risk threshold and the implementation of bans or restrictive measures. High risks
might be considered socially acceptable, while lower risks might not. Rather, it means that con-
siderations as to whether and why uncertain risks are acceptable should be taken into due con-
sideration in setting the threshold of socially acceptable risk.33 A further implication is that risk
regulation will be open to political and societal debate about the level of protection pursued, the
reasons why uncertain risks are—or are not—worth running, and the distributional implications
of regulatory measures. In regulatory terms,34 the EU system of risk governance draws on socially
acceptable approaches.
By contrast, ideal evidence-based regulatory models reflect the hegemonic narrative on risk
governance, whereby uncertain risks must be taken as long as specific adverse effects have not
been scientifically established35 or insofar as this regulatory option is cost-benefit effective.36
Evidence-based approaches postulate a sound scientific—rather than prudential—approach to
risk assessment, and adherence to sound science. Regulatory focus on persisting uncertainty is
bound to be limited; from a sound scientific perspective, positive scientific proof of the existence
of a specific hazard and materialisation of a risk is the precondition for regulation.37
Reliance on the results of sound risk assessments and adherence to sound science are economi-
cally cost-benefit effective in and of themselves; quite intuitively, they relieve market actors from
the regulatory burdens and economic costs associated with more cautious approaches. In this
sense, they indirectly reflect the pursuit of a cost-benefit effective level of protection. And indeed,
in cases where hazards and risks have been conclusively established, economic cost-benefit analy-
sis will come into play directly.38 Cost-benefit analysis heuristics, based on the calculation of an
aggregate value of expected wealth maximization, apply to risk management. Risk regulation
should only be enacted insofar as the relevant expected public health and environmental benefits
outweigh the economic costs associated with regulation. The legally relevant threshold of risk is
determined by means of economic cost-benefit analysis. All in all, the adverse effects of a product
30See also Leonelli, The Perfect Storm: GMO Governance and the EU Technocratic Turn, supra note 8; Leonelli, The
Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of EU Risk Regulation, supra note 8. For a reference to OLFs, see
supra note 14, at 19. In EU legislation, see General Food Law, supra note 12, at recital (19), arts. 3(12), 6(3).
31Leonelli, Transnational Narratives and Regulation of GMO Risks, supra note 18.
32On the notion of “iterative” approaches to risk regulation, see Fisher, supra note 7.
33For a reflection on the implications of different approaches to risk regulation and the reasons why uncertain risks ought to
be taken, see Lee, supra note 7.
34Although not always or not necessarily in terms of regulatory implementation—for controversial cases, see supra note 8.
35E.g., regardless of persisting uncertainty on the existence of hazards or materialization of risks. See Leonelli, Transnational
Narratives and Regulation of GMO Risks, supra note 18.
36E.g., in cases where hazards and risks have been conclusively established see id.
37For a detailed analysis of these points, see id.
38For an in depth analysis, see id.
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or process should not be “unreasonable” or “excessive,” taking into account the economic benefits
associated with the product or process as well as the economic costs of regulation.39
This overview triggers two considerations. The first and more general consideration relates to
the two ideal approaches and their nature, whereas the second and more specific reflection per-
tains to the relationship between the precautionary principle and the notion of administrative
discretion. Starting from the first and broader consideration, an analysis through the lens of evi-
dence-based and socially acceptable risk approaches demonstrates that the identification of the
threshold of legally relevant adverse effects is never a matter of “pure” science.40 Rather, the deter-
mination of the threshold of risk triggering regulatory intervention results from three factors.41
The first factor consists of recourse to more or less prudential approaches to risk assessment. The
second factor is the extent to which regulators focus on sound science or uncertainties surrounding
the existence of hazards or the materialization of risks, and take into consideration the perceived
insufficiency of the available evidence. The third factor is the level of protection pursued by reg-
ulators, and the specific factors that they may take into account for the purposes of decision-
making. These are the normative frames which directly or indirectly inform the entire risk regu-
lation process.42 Under evidence-based models, regulators are bound to pursue an economically
cost-benefit effective level of protection. Under socially acceptable risk approaches, by contrast, the
intended level of protection may be higher. Further, OLFsmay be taken into account and feed into
the determination of the threshold of acceptable risk.
Against this backdrop, the dichotomy of allegedly neutral and objective sound scientific
approaches versus politicized precautionary risk management neither does justice to the reality
of scientific complexity, nor to the normative frames at play in the risk governance process.
The twofold assumption that sound scientific approaches must be adhered to and that sound sci-
ence must be relied on is informed by non-scientific considerations surrounding regulatory cost-
benefit effectiveness, just like consideration of non-scientific OLFs and the desire to pursue
enhanced levels of protection are reflected in recourse to prudential approaches and a focus
on persisting uncertainty.43 Neither regulatory model is neutral and objective.
A similar dichotomous construction surfaces in cases where both hazards and risks have been
conclusively established. In these cases, stringent regulatory standards are alleged to result from a
focus on hazards, rather than risks,44 suggesting that regulators irrationally focused on the haz-
ardous properties of a product—“hazard,” rather than on the probability of occurrence of adverse
effects and their severity—“risk.” Clearly, this is unlikely to be the case.45 Diverging regulatory
standards in these instances result from a different evidence base (more or less prudential risk
assessments), from different perspectives on scientific uncertainties and scientific insufficiency,
and from the pursuit of different levels of protection. Indeed, even in cases where uncertainties
are not salient, the threshold of acceptable risk is bound to vary if the intended level of protection
diverges. Adverse effects which are considered “negligible,” “acceptable,” or not “unreasonable” in
some jurisdictions may be differently evaluated in other legal systems.46
The second and more specific consideration, as noted above, pertains to the relationship
between the precautionary principle and the notion of administrative discretion. In legal systems
drawing on evidence-based models, risk governance functions are allocated to regulatory—
39Id.
40This sentence and terminology is borrowed from Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a ‘Neutral Arbiter’ for Triggering
Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 198 (2003).
41For an in depth analysis, see Leonelli, Transnational Narratives and Regulation of GMO Risks, supra note 18.
42Id.
43Id.
44For an example of this reductionist perspective, see Ragnar E. Lofstedt, Risk Versus Hazard: How to Regulate in the 21st
Century, 2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 149 (2011)..
45See infra, Section F, for a reference in the context of the analysis of the PPP Regulation.
46Leonelli, Transnational Narratives and Regulation of GMO Risks, supra note 18.
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technical-scientific—agencies; these are in charge of risk assessment as well as risk management.47
The results of sound scientific risk assessment and evaluations surrounding economic cost-benefit
effectiveness are all that should inform regulatory responses. Accordingly, authority lies with tech-
nical experts. From this perspective, under evidence-based approaches, administrative discretion
is ultimately curtailed by the need to adhere to sound science and conform to the overarching
tenets of cost-benefit analysis.
Conversely, in the EU legal system, risk assessors are only responsible for informing the tech-
nical-scientific knowledge of political risk managers; this reflects the rationale and goals of socially
acceptable risk approaches. Final decision-making rests with risk managers, who are in charge for
setting the threshold of socially acceptable risk and who are endowed with broad discretionary
powers. The superiority of political and democratic legitimacy over functional legitimacy—tech-
nical expertise—shines through socially acceptable risk approaches.48 However, a comparison
between the institutional framework of EU risk governance and different regulatory models trig-
gers one further, important consideration.
For the purposes of the present inquiry, a contextual analysis of systems influenced by evi-
dence-based and socially acceptable risk approaches shows that the EU institutions’ broad discre-
tionary powers stem from the need to take the precautionary principle and OLFs into account in
the determination of the threshold of acceptable risk. Indeed, if the precautionary principle and
OLFs were irrelevant, political authorities would neither be in charge of risk management nor
would they enjoy broad discretionary powers. In other words, in the field of EU risk regulation,
political and administrative discretion is not self-standing. Rather, it derives from the overarching
tenets of the precautionary principle and the need to take enhanced levels of protection and all
relevant OLFs into due consideration.
Against this overall background, an analysis through the lens of socially acceptable risk
approaches shows that the precautionary principle can be framed as an inner limit to the broad
discretion of EU risk managers. Similar considerations apply to the case of EU legislators. Not only
is the precautionary principle enshrined in the Treaties, it also underlies the institutional archi-
tecture of EU risk regulation and the delicate balance between functional and political-democratic
legitimacy in this field.
C. The Precautionary Principle and EU Judicial Review
The case law of the Court has acknowledged the need for EU risk managers or EU legislators to
take the precautionary principle into due consideration when adopting risk regulation measures.49
This point is overall uncontroversial. The problem is, rather, how to substantiate compliance with
the precautionary principle as an inner limit to the EU institutions’ broad discretion in the field of
risk regulation. The question then becomes how to judicially review compliance with the precau-
tionary principle, when the latter is used as a sword. This specific question must be differently
framed and addressed in respect of challenges to regulatory and legislative acts.50
How is the Court to review compliance with the precautionary principle when the latter is used
to attack regulatory acts which allegedly breach the precautionary principle, identify too low a
threshold of acceptable risk, and do not ensure a sufficiently high level of protection? Several
47Notably, in the United States. For an analysis, see id.
48For this acknowledgment, see Pfizer, Case T-13/99 at para. 149.
49For a finding that risk managers are bound to take precautionary action where precautionary risk management is war-
ranted, see, for example, France v. Commission, Case T-257/07 at para. 66 (“[T]he precautionary principle is a general prin-
ciple of EU law requiring the authorities in question, in the particular context of the exercise of the powers conferred on
them . . . to take appropriate measures to prevent specific potential risks.”) (citing Artegodan and Others, Joined Cases T-
74, 76, 83, 85, 132, 137 & 141/00 at para. 184).
50On the difference between the two, see CJEU, Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625 (Oct. 3,
2013).
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difficulties arise in this respect, and a few preliminary considerations on the Court’s standard of
review in the field of EU risk regulation are necessary.
The Court has consistently acknowledged the broad discretion of EU institutions in cases
involving complex technical evaluations.51 More specifically, as reiterated in Fedesa, “[discretion]
does not apply exclusively to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken but also to some
extent to the finding of the basic facts . . . .”52 Thus, in reviewing the exercise of such discretion, the
Court “must confine itself to examining whether [an act] contains a manifest error or constitutes a
misuse of power or whether the authority [clearly exceeded] the bounds of its discretion.”53
Further, as highlighted since Pfizer and Alpharma, EU institutions enjoy a broad discretion when
determining the level of risk deemed acceptable for society.54 Thus, the Court has traditionally
focused on and emphasised administrative discretion. The acknowledgment of the risk manager’s
broad discretion has consistently been the starting point in the Court’s examination.
In cases where EU precautionary acts are challenged for being too restrictive, the broad admin-
istrative discretion of EU institutions implies that the Court can neither review the quality or
soundness of the scientific evidence relied upon by the risk manager nor substitute its scientific
evaluations for the ones of the risk manager.55 A manifest error of assessment is all that can invali-
date the relevant measures. While the notion of a manifest error has been differently framed and
interpreted by the Court throughout its case law,56 this test generally aims to and succeeds in
safeguarding the EU risk manager’s administrative discretion in choosing to enact precautionary
measures. Ultimately, regardless of whether the Court focuses on mere administrative discretion
or administrative discretion in precautionary risk management, precautionary measures are usu-
ally safeguarded.57 These are cases where the precautionary principle directly or indirectly per-
forms the function of a shield.58
Under the different scenario where the precautionary principle is used as a sword, EUmeasures
are challenged for not being protective enough. Framing the precautionary principle as an inner
limit to the EU institutions’ broad administrative discretion—as suggested in the previous section
—comes with a set of legal implications. From this perspective, the manifest error of assessment
test, as applicable to challenges involving acts which are deemed too restrictive, should not apply
where the precautionary principle is used as a sword.
Ultimately, the notion of a manifest error is relevant in cases where the applicants—or referring
courts—claim that EU risk regulatory measures are not informed by sound science or do not
adhere to the positive results of a risk assessment. EU institutions are not under an obligation
to enact evidence-based regulatory measures. In this sense, the Court’s acknowledgment of the
risk manager’s broad discretion in precautionary risk management and the finding that only a
manifest error of assessment can lead to the annulment of the relevant measures reflects the insti-
tutional architecture of EU risk regulation. A manifest error is all that can invalidate an EU act
where EU institutions have exercised their discretion to enact precautionary measures.
Conversely, if the precautionary principle is framed as an inner limit to the EU institutions’ broad
discretion, the relevant question in challenges against insufficiently protective acts should not be
51See CJEU, Case C-138/79, Roquette v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1980:249 (Oct. 29, 1980), para. 25.
52Opinion of Advocate General Mischo at para 12, Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex parte: Fedesa and others (Nov. 30, 1990) [hereafter Fedesa]. See also Pfizer, Case T-
13/99 at para. 168; Alpharma, Case T-70/99 at para. 179.
53Fedesa, Case C-331/88 at para 12. See also Pfizer, Case T-13/99 at para. 166; Alpharma, Case T-70/99 at para. 177.
54See Pfizer, Case T-13/99 at para. 167; Alpharma, Case T-70/99 at para. 178.
55See, e.g., Pfizer, Case T-13/99 at para.169; Alpharma, Case T-70/99 at para. 180, (“[T]he judicature is not entitled to
substitute its assessment of the facts for that of [EU] institutions.”).
56Leonelli, Acknowledging the Centrality of the Precautionary Principle in Judicial Review of EU Risk Regulation: Why it
Matters, supra note 18.
57Id.
58For use of the terminology of the precautionary principle as a “shield” or a “sword,” see Scott & Vos, supra note 3.
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whether EU institutions have incurred a manifest error. Rather, the question becomes whether EU
risk managers have complied with the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle. As the
next sections show, the Court has implicitly recognized the difference between judicial review of
acts which are deemed too restrictive, on the one hand, and acts deemed insufficiently protective,
on the other hand. While in the latter case the Court has sometimes resorted to the manifest error
test,59 it has ultimately applied it differently.
Yet, the relevance of the notion of administrative discretion and its relationship to precaution-
ary risk management resurfaces in judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle.
The main problem in cases where the precautionary principle is used as a sword lies in striking a
fair balance between judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle, on the one
hand, and the acknowledgment of the EU risk manager’s discretion in complying with the precau-
tionary principle, on the other hand. This dichotomy is encapsulated in the Court’s finding in
Artegodan that, in the face of scientific uncertainty:
[W]hether to have recourse to the precautionary principle depends as a general rule on the
level of protection chosen by the competent authority in the exercise of its discretion . . . .
That choice must, however, comply with the principle that the protection of public health,
safety and the environment is to take precedence over economic interests . . . .60
As already explained, the precautionary principle mandates that precautionary measures should
be enacted when, in the face of inconclusive, insufficient, or incomplete scientific evidence, uncer-
tain risks might not meet the intended level of protection. This definition entails the exercise of
discretion in at least three respects: in the evaluation of the entity and extent of scientific uncer-
tainty triggering application of the principle; in the identification of the intended level of protection
in the field; and in the final determination that, in the face of scientific uncertainty and having
regard to the intended level of protection, a specific risk is too high to meet the threshold of accept-
able risk. In this context, how can the Court fruitfully review whether scientific uncertainty war-
rants the enactment of precautionary measures, whether the intended level of protection is high
enough, and whether the resulting threshold of acceptable risk is too low? Ultimately, this calls
into question the possibility to set the boundaries of discretion in compliance with the precau-
tionary principle, establishing the specific conditions under which these boundaries are over-
stepped. Indeed, judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle would
otherwise become a slippery slope; in the face of persisting scientific uncertainty, any measure
short of a ban or stringent restriction could in abstract be challenged for allowing risks which
are perceived as socially unacceptable.
Further difficulties in the use of the precautionary principle as a sword arise with respect to the
burden of proof. Challenging a precautionary risk management measure for being too restrictive,
on the grounds of alleged manifest errors of assessment or a misapplication of the precautionary
principle, might seem hard. Yet, in these cases, the applicants usually lament the application of
prudential methods or models, point to the positive results of risk assessment, and focus on the
absence of conclusive scientific proof of hazards or risks.61 None of this happens where a measure
is challenged for not being precautionary enough.
In this case the applicants will point to uncertainties emerging from the single stages of risk
assessment, different studies referring to persisting scientific uncertainty, the insufficiency or
incompleteness of relevant data, and the failure to conduct further assessments to dispel uncer-
tainty. In the best case scenario, they might be able to adduce diverging evidence on the
59See infra, Sections D and F.
60Artegodan and Others, Joined Cases T-74, 76, 83, 85, 132, 137 & 141/00 at para. 184.
61Leonelli, Acknowledging the Centrality of the Precautionary Principle in Judicial Review of EU Risk Regulation: Why it
Matters, supra note 18.
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characterisation of the relevant hazards or risks. In any case, in evidentiary terms, using the pre-
cautionary principle as a sword is without a doubt more difficult than challenging a precautionary
act for being too restrictive. This is inherent to the sound science—what has been conclusively
proven and established—versus uncertainty—what is unknown— dichotomy. This point triggers
a set of further questions. How pervasive must scientific uncertainty be, how likely and how high
the relevant risks, and how significant the potential adverse effects, for the Court to find that the
risk manager has not complied with the precautionary principle? What is the requisite standard of
proof? As the next section illustrates, the Court has given some indications on both issues, by
indirectly setting the boundaries of discretion in compliance with the precautionary principle
and providing some insights on the requisite standard of proof. These indications emerge from
two cases: Paraquat, which is the only successful action where the precautionary principle has
been used as a sword, and France v. Commission.
Challenges to legislative acts trigger a different set of considerations. Different evaluations as to
whether legislative frameworks and regulatory arrangements are robust enough to ensure that a
comprehensive risk assessment is conducted, uncertainties are dispelled, and the risk manager is
in a position to enact precautionary measures are at stake. The three cases analyzed in the follow-
ing sections involved a request for a preliminary ruling on the validity of legislative acts; in all
cases, the referring court raised doubts as to the compatibility of legislative provisions with
the precautionary principle, using the latter as a sword. These cases call into question the institu-
tional architecture and regulatory arrangements underlying the relevant legislative frameworks.
These regulatory arrangements, in turn, are based on specific legislative choices as to the precon-
ditions for conducting a risk assessment,62 the boundaries and scope of risk assessment,63 the
scope of application of the legislative acts,64 and the distribution of regulatory authority among
EU institutions and Member States.65
Clearly, judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle comes with several dif-
ficulties in the case of legislative acts. First, the referring courts have called into doubt whether the
procedural governance arrangements underpinning the legislative acts would enable the relevant
institutions to take into due consideration the precautionary principle and ensure a high level of
protection in substantive terms. The questions of the national courts boil down to whether the
regulatory arrangements in place are sufficient for a thorough risk assessment to be conducted
and scientific uncertainty to be dispelled as much as possible.66 In this sense, the national courts’
questions on compliance with the precautionary principle suggest that the regulatory arrange-
ments are inadequate for the purpose of informing the technical-scientific knowledge of the risk
manager and enabling him to set the threshold of acceptable risk, taking the precautionary prin-
ciple into account. These elements can be very hard to review.
Second, it can be difficult to draw a line between questions of regulation and institutional archi-
tecture, on the one hand, and regulatory implementation, on the other hand. Regulatory arrange-
ments can be perfectly fit, in abstract terms, to ensure that a comprehensive risk assessment is
conducted and all relevant evidence gathered at one or more institutional levels. Yet regulatory
practice at the implementation stage might not achieve this goal, undermining precautionary risk
management. The two dimensions should not be confused. Judicial review by the Court can only
target the regulatory arrangements underlying the institutional framework.
62See Monsanto Italia, Case C-236/01.
63See Monsanto Italia, Case C-236/01; Blaise, Case C-616/17.
64Confédération Paysanne, Case C-528/16.
65Blaise, Case C-616/17.
66Monsanto Italia, Case C-236/01, involved an evaluation of comparative—as opposed to risk—assessments. Confédération
Paysanne, Case C-528/16, entailed an evaluation of the scope of application of the Deliberate Release Directive, with all con-
nected regulatory obligations. Finally, Blaise, Case C-616/17, involved an evaluation of the governance arrangements in place
for risk assessment of pesticidal active substances and plant protection products—pesticides.
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Finally, it is worth stressing that legislative acts, adopted under the legislative procedures,
enjoy a high degree of democratic legitimacy. In her Opinion in Inuit, Advocate General
Kokott justified the limits to direct access to the CJEU when legislative—rather than regula-
tory—acts are at stake on the grounds of the former’s democratic legitimacy.67 Arguably, to
some extent, the difference between legislative and regulatory acts is also reflected in the differ-
ent intensity of the Court’s review.
Against this overall background, the following sections turn to an analysis of cases involv-
ing regulatory and legislative acts respectively. Section D starts by providing an overview of
Paraquat and France v. Commission, the only cases involving insufficiently protective regu-
latory acts where the Court has examined the issue of compliance with the precautionary prin-
ciple.68 Sections E and F examine challenges to legislative acts where the precautionary
principle has been used as a sword. Section E analyzes Monsanto Italia and Confédération
Paysanne, while Section F engages in a more detailed examination of the highly complex mat-
ters at stake in Blaise.
D. Judicial Review of EU Regulatory Acts: The “Quantitative Threshold” Approach
In Paraquat, Sweden challenged the approval of a pesticidal active substance by means of its
inclusion in Annex I to Directive 91/414—the predecessor of the PPP Regulation. Scientific
uncertainty persisted as to the extent of the risks posed by exposure to paraquat, including
the possibility of adverse effects such as limited capacity to absorb oxygen, skin cancer, and
development of Parkinson‘s Disease.69 Further, this active substance is acknowledged to cause
fatal effects on birds and hares. The Scientific Committee on Plants and the Commission, basing
their decision on field exposure studies, took the view that paraquat would not pose any sig-
nificant health risks for operators as long as it was used as recommended under prescribed good
working practices. As to the adverse effects on birds and hares, the Scientific Committee and the
Commission argued that further information on realistic exposure would be needed for the pur-
poses of a definitive risk assessment, but risks would be acceptable as long as risk mitigation
measures were in place.70
Sweden raised two pleas in law. In the first plea, it alleged several infringements of the relevant
procedures.71 In the second plea, it lamented an infringement of Article 5 of the 1991 Directive, a
breach of the precautionary principle, and a breach of the principle that a high level of public
health and environmental protection must be ensured.72 Upon an analysis of the uncertain risks
to public health posed by the use of paraquat, Sweden pointed out that the models applied and the
evidence from field studies showed that the exposure of users to paraquat would exceed the
Acceptable Operator Exposure Level (AOEL) provided for under Article 5 and Annex VI of
67Opinion of Advocate General Kokott at para. 38, Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (Jan. 17, 2013).
68It is only in a few instances that challenges against EU regulatory acts deemed insufficiently protective have been brought
on the basis of the precautionary principle. In all cases but Paraquat, Case T-229/04, the relevant acts have been annulled for
breaches of procedural provisions which are unrelated to the application of the precautionary principle. See CJEU, Case C-
393/01, France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2003:307 (May 22, 2003); CJEU, Case C-14/06, Parliament and Denmark v.
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:176 (Apr. 1, 2008); CJEU, Case T-240/10, Hungary v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:645
(Dec. 13, 2013). In one case, France v. Commission, the action and appeal were unsuccessful. Overall, it is unsurprising
to see how few these actions are; it is equally unsurprising that they have all been brought by Member States. Owing to
the standing criteria of TFEU Article 263(4), environmental NGOs or societal stakeholders willing to use the precautionary
principle as a sword in challenges against regulatory acts face considerable obstacles in direct access to the CJEU. For an
overview of these obstacles, see Giulia Claudia Leonelli, A Threefold Blow to Environmental Public Interest Litigation: The
Urgent Need to Reform the Aarhus Regulation, 45 EUR. L. REV. 324 (2020).
69Paraquat, Case T-229/04 at paras. 59, 60, 65–68.
70Id. at para. 42.
71This plea in law was also upheld.
72Paraquat, Case T-229/04 at para. 54.
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the Directive.73 According to the Annex, authorizations could not be granted if the extent of oper-
ator exposure in handling and using the plant protection product under the proposed conditions
of use, including doses and application methods, exceeded the AOEL.
Sweden supported a precautionary interpretation of Article 5 and Annex VI, emphasizing that
“a substance may not be included in Annex I until it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that
a product containing that active substance can be used with complete safety in at least one rep-
resentative type of use.”74 On these grounds, it submitted that the relevant scientific evidence was
insufficient to support the conclusion that paraquat would not pose significant risks to public
health, and that the legal provisions of the 1991 Directive, the precautionary principle, and
the principle of a high level of health protection had been breached.75 With regard to the adverse
effects on birds and hares, Sweden complained that the scientific dossier contained insufficient
evidence on exposure to prove that the environmental risks of paraquat would be acceptable.
The Commission, with respect to both claims, argued that all relevant scientific evidence had been
taken into due account and that the risks posed by paraquat would be acceptable, as long as risk
mitigation measures were complied with.
The Court found that Article 5 of the Directive, “interpreted in combination with the precau-
tionary principle, [implies that] in the domain of human health the existence of solid evidence
which, while not resolving scientific uncertainty, may reasonably raise doubts as to the safety
of a substance, justifies, in principle, the refusal to include that substance in Annex I.”76 Again
by reference to the precautionary principle, it noted that “before including a substance in
Annex I . . . it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the restrictions on the use
of the substance involved make it possible to ensure that use of that substance will be in accor-
dance with the requirements . . . .”77
Against this backdrop, it went on to assess whether the evidence adduced by Sweden could
raise doubts as to the safety of paraquat, in accordance with the criteria enshrined in Article 5
and Annex VI. The Court found that the Guatemalan and French studies relied upon by
Sweden constituted solid evidence attesting to a level of exposure higher than the AOEL,
and raised doubts as to the safety of paraquat for operators.78 As to the complaints alleging
that scientific evidence on adverse effects on birds and hares was insufficient to establish that
the risks were acceptable,79 again, the Court maintained that, in accordance with the
73See id. at para. 70:
[Sweden] claims, first of all, that the models show without ambiguity that the exposure of users to paraquat exceeds
the AOEL. It states that, according to the two models used to calculate the exposure of professional users to para-
quat, taking account of the presence or absence of personal protective equipment and different ways of using the
substance (knapsack or tractor-mounted sprays) the exposure of such users exceeds by 4 to 100 times the threshold
laid down. The values are 20 to 100 times higher than the AOEL for workers using a knapsack but not wearing
protective clothing whereas they are 60 times higher than the AOEL where gloves are used when handling or
spraying the substance. Finally, even with gloves, breathing equipment, overalls, wide-brimmed hats and solid
shoes, the level of exposure is above the AOEL.
See also id. at para. 71, on field studies.
74Id. at paras. 140, 141 (emphasis added).
75Id. at paras. 139–59.
76Id. at para. 161 (emphasis added).
77Id. at para. 170.
78Id. at paras. 172–92.
79See id. paras. 192–215 (emphasis added):
[Sweden] claims, in substance, that point C 2.5.2.1 of Annex VI indicates that, where there is a possibility of birds
or other non-target terrestrial vertebrates being exposed, a special upper limit and a margin of safety—in accor-
dance with which the long-term toxicity/exposure ratio is to be 5 or above—must be applied. However, the studies
on which the Commission based its assessment of paraquat show that the ratio in question was only 2. It adds that
the Commission has not shown that there is a use for paraquat in which the risk of exposure for ground-nesting
birds would be acceptable. It follows that the Commission cannot conclude, on the basis of the existing dossier, that
there are no unacceptable risks.
196 Giulia Claudia Leonelli
precautionary principle, the existence of solid evidence which may reasonably raise doubts as
to the safety of a substance justifies its non-inclusion.80 The Court found that, under Annex
VI, no authorizations should be granted where the long-term toxicity and exposure ratio is
below five, unless an appropriate risk assessment showed no unacceptable impact due to risk
mitigation measures.81 However, as argued by Sweden, the scientific evidence relied upon by
the Commission was insufficient for the purposes of such risk assessment.82 On these grounds,
both branches—public health and environmental risks—of the pleas in law alleging infringe-
ment of the 1991 Directive, breach of the precautionary principle, and breach of a high level of
protection were accepted.
Paraquat sheds some light on the threshold of risk which will trigger a finding that the risk
manager has failed to comply with the precautionary principle. In this case, scientific evidence
pointed to severe potential adverse effects of paraquat on human health. Further, lethal or
quasi-lethal effects on animals had been established. Scientific uncertainty and disagreements
as to the adequacy and effectiveness of risk mitigation measures were also very high. In the case
of public health, some models and field studies testified that exposure would still considerably
exceed the AOEL; in the case of animal health, the data was insufficient to establish realistic expo-
sure. Therefore, the relevant uncertain risks were significant. Further, the Court’s reasoning and
interpretation of the Directive in light of the precautionary principle was supported by the express
AOEL and toxicity and exposure ratio requirements of Annex VI. In this sense, the Commission
had failed to meet its burden of proof; it had failed to establish that the authorization of paraquat,
in the face of persisting uncertainty, would comply with the explicit requirements of the Directive.
What can be inferred from Paraquat is that the threshold of risk triggering a breach of the
precautionary principle is a very high one. Scientific uncertainty, including the insufficiency
and incompleteness of available scientific evidence, must be very high. The relevant risks, as result-
ing from the specific hazards and potential exposure, must also be very high. As a consequence, it
will be highly unlikely, if not implausible, that the risk manager has pursued a high level of pro-
tection. On these grounds, the Court will be able to infer that the threshold of acceptable risk is too
low for compliance with the precautionary principle.
In this sense, the threshold for a judicial finding that the precautionary principle has been
breached is quantitative, rather than qualitative. Symmetrically, the burden of proof is very high
on the applicants. The latter will have to adduce evidence that the relevant risks are very high,
which could be established by reference to high levels of uncertainty, high hazards, and high expo-
sures, or significant divergencies in data obtained through the application of different models.
This quantitative approach blurs the boundaries between review of compliance with the pre-
cautionary principle, on the one hand, and manifest errors of assessment, on the other hand.
Admittedly, more than a mere breach of the precautionary principle was at stake in Paraquat;
the Commission had failed to make a convincing case that the approval of the active substance
complied with a set of express legislative requirements. In this sense, it might as well have man-
ifestly erred in its evaluation that the use of paraquat complied with the relevant legislative pro-
visions. Nonetheless, it is still worth stressing that a deferential review of the Commission’s broad
discretion might have resulted in a finding that the Commission had not incurred a manifest error
of assessment.
All in all, was the decision in Paraquat about manifest errors of assessment or a breach of the
precautionary principle? Is it reasonable to suggest that the decision in Paraquat would have
looked the same, if considerable uncertainties persisted but the legislative requirements—for
example the AOEL—had been somewhat met? Both questions are rather difficult to answer.
Undoubtedly, the precautionary principle played a key role in the Court’s interpretation. On these
80Id. at para. 224.
81Id. at para. 226.
82Id. at para. 233–52.
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grounds, and considering the high risks identified in this case, we may infer that even under a
scenario where the AOEL had been somewhat met, the Court would have taken the same quan-
titative threshold perspective and annulled the act. In this sense, the Court’s decision does not rest
on the identification of a mere manifest error of assessment; compliance with the precautionary
principle was at stake. What is certain, however, is that judicial review of compliance with the
precautionary principle will not catch measures which are perceived as insufficiently protective
in qualitative terms.
This is perfectly illustrated by France v. Commission, where the typical precautionary principle
dilemma was at stake. How safe is safe,83 and when is safe safe enough?84 How should the boun-
daries of precautionary levels of protection be outlined, and how should the threshold of accept-
able risk be reviewed? In this case, France challenged a 2008 Commission Regulation authorizing
less restrictive measures of surveillance and eradication for ovine and caprine flocks in the context
of prevention and control of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). By its sole plea in
law, France alleged a breach of the precautionary principle in the context of both risk assessment
and risk management.85 This was substantiated by a plurality of complaints surrounding the
Commission’s disregard or misinterpretation of persisting uncertainty on the transmissibility
of TSEs to humans, the reliability of the tests adopted, the alleged biased use of the EFSA’s
Opinion, and the failure to assess the increase in risk resulting from the adoption of the less
restrictive measures. In other words, France argued that in light of persisting uncertainties, the
risks associated with the relaxation of the measures were too high to be acceptable and did
not meet the requirement of a high level of protection.
The Court thoroughly analyzed whether all relevant assessments had been conducted, whether
the Commission had taken their results into due consideration, and, importantly, the entity and
extent of persisting uncertainties and the level of any relevant risks to public health. At paragraph
86, the Court mentioned the manifest error of assessment test, arguing that the evidence adduced
by France would have to be sufficient “to make the factual assessments used in the act implau-
sible.”86 Nonetheless, in fact, the Court’s review focused on the boundaries of scientific uncertainty
and the level of risk arising from the new measures, confirming the quantitative threshold
approach outline above. Throughout the judgment, the Court explicitly and repeatedly referred
to the finding that the risks in this field were “low,”87 “very low,”88 or “extremely low.”89 Against
this backdrop, the Court concluded that the Commission was entitled to relax the pre-existing risk
management measures without incurring a manifest error of assessment; in other words, uncer-
tain risks were low enough to ensure that the level of protection would be sufficiently high.
This case demonstrates that by following a quantitative threshold approach, the Court will not
engage with normative disagreements surrounding qualitative evaluations of risk. Namely, the
determination of whether uncertain risks are acceptable and whether the decision to run these
risks meets the goal of enhanced and precautionary levels of protection. As explained above,
uncertainties can arise in a plurality of contexts. Further, and as occurred in France v.
Commission, even the same science can be interpreted differently and lead to different inferences
and conclusions as to whether uncertain risks are acceptable. This is the slippery slope of the pre-
cautionary principle; normative and political disagreements over the identification of the intended
level of protection and threshold of acceptable risk will often persist. Arguably, this qualitative
aspect of controversy goes to the heart of the precautionary principle, reaching its authentic
understanding and value. The Court, however, will not engage with this dimension.
83Nicolas de Sadeleer, The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law, 12 EUR. L.J. 139, 147 (2006).
84Lee, supra note 7, at 244.
85France v. Commission, Case T-257/07 at para. 90.
86Id. at para. 86.
87See id. at paras. 104, 109, 137, 149.
88See id. at paras. 107, 150, 151, 163–71, 219, 261.
89See id. at paras. 96, 98, 100, 108, 109, 150, 151, 155, 159, 229, 230, 240, 251.
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This is legally tenable and appropriate in light of the nature of the precautionary principle. By
implicitly resorting to a quantitative threshold approach, the Court has ultimately set the boun-
daries for judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle, as opposed to the exer-
cise of discretion in complying with the precautionary principle. The quantitative threshold
approach enables review of compliance with the precautionary principle. Qualitative disagree-
ments, by contrast, will not be caught, as discretion in complying with the precautionary principle
will be safeguarded.
In legal terms, this strikes a fair balance between the two dimensions. In this sense, however, the
inner limits to the risk manager’s exercise of his broad administrative discretion are quite thin.
Qualitative disagreements on the threshold of acceptable risk will have to be solved in the political
arena. As clearly emerges from the Court’s case law, “the level of risk deemed unacceptable for
society in a specific case results from a political choice which lies with the competent authority and
not with the Court.”90 Further, “. . . policy concerns . . . must be dealt with in political fora. It is not
for this or any other court to determine proper national or [EU] environmental policy.”91
E. Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts (I): The Nature and Scope of Risk
Assessment
InMonsanto Italia, the Court was called upon to deliver a ruling on the interpretation and validity
of the simplified procedure for the placing on the market of genetically engineered food and feed
ingredients (GMOs), as provided for under the old system of Regulation 258/97. Pursuant to the
Annex to Recommendation 97/618, where a novel (in the case at hand, genetically engineered)
food was deemed to be substantially equivalent to its conventional counterpart, the former would
not go through an encompassing risk assessment. Thus, no toxicological data and no further test-
ing would be needed.92 The simplified notification procedure would then apply.
At a general level, regulatory approaches to the governance of genetically engineered organisms
may either draw on product or process-based models. Under the former model, the process of
genetic engineering is presumed not to pose inherent risks; genetically engineered organisms,
as a class, are presumed to be substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts, unless
they have specific characteristics or properties. Under the precautionary process-based model, by
contrast, all genetically engineered organisms are the object of a thorough risk assessment. Use of
the simplified procedure, on the basis of a mere comparative assessment of substantial equiva-
lence, clearly drew on a product-based approach. Many Member States had expressed concerns
about the use of the simplified procedure, pointing to the uncertain risks posed by genetically
engineered food varieties.93 The Commission also entertained some doubts as to its adequacy.94
The new 2001 to 2003 framework, indeed, draws on a process-based model.
In those circumstances, the referring court raised several questions surrounding the interpre-
tation of the simplified procedure, the Member States’ power to resort to the safeguard clause of
90Id. at para. 214.
91Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston at para. 145, Joined Cases C-439 & 454/05, Land Oberösterreich and Austria v.
Commission (15 May 2007).
92Monsanto Italia, Case C-236/01 at para. 14. For a commentary on this case, see also Dabrowska, GM Foods, Risk,
Precaution and the Internal Market: Did Both Sides Win the Day in the Recent Judgment of the Court of Justice?, 5
GERMAN L. J. 151 (2004).
93Monsanto Italia, Case C-236/01 at para. 37.
94Id. at para. 65.
Following . . . critical reassessment, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that, given the current state of sci-
entific research, it appears that foods containing transgenic protein may, in principle, no longer be considered
substantially equivalent to existing foods within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 3(4) of
Regulation No 258/97 unless a full assessment of their characteristics makes it possible to be certain beyond
any reasonable doubt that all the conditions laid down in that provision are satisfied.
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Article 12(1) of the 1997 Regulation, and the validity of the simplified procedure in light of the
precautionary principle.95 All in all, the referring court expressed doubts on the assessments con-
ducted under the simplified procedure, implying that the latter would not enable risk managers to
collect sufficient information on the uncertain risks posed by genetically engineered foods. On
these grounds, it suggested that the regulatory arrangements underlying the streamlined simpli-
fied procedure neither complied with the precautionary principle nor ensured a high level of
protection.
In its analysis, the Court first argued that comparative assessments aim to identify potential
risks on the basis of the differences observed between genetically engineered organisms and con-
ventional counterparts. It then went on to argue that, where differences and potential risks have
been identified, a more comprehensive assessment would be required. On these grounds, it sug-
gested that the simplified procedure did not undermine the precautionary principle, given that the
identification of differences and potential risks would trigger a risk assessment.96 Arguably, this
part of the ruling misses the whole point of the national court’s question. In the face of persisting
uncertainty on the effects of genetic engineering, a mere comparative assessment is—as such—
insufficient to detect potential risks; rather, a more thorough risk assessment should be conducted
for each and every variety. This is what the national court meant by inquiring into compliance
with the precautionary principle.
Second, the Court noted that the recognition of substantial equivalence might have been sub-
sequently reassessed at EU or national level.97 Finally, it found that the safeguard clause enshrined
in Article 12 of the Regulation gave express recognition to the precautionary principle.98 Against
this overall backdrop, it concluded that the provisions relating to the simplified procedure com-
plied with the precautionary principle.
This case shows the Court’s unequivocal reluctance to engage in a thorough analysis of the
regulatory architecture of the 1997 Regulation. The Court refrained from inquiring into the
robustness of the relevant arrangements and from analyzing whether—in conditions of scientific
uncertainty—comparative assessments under the simplified procedure would in fact provide the
risk manager with all necessary scientific evidence, enabling him to take a precautionary approach
to risk management. Ultimately, in this case the Court refrained from taking a position in the
scientifically and politically controversial field of genetically engineered organisms, leaving it
to the EU legislator to overhaul the legislative framework. Though this is politically understand-
able, it is fair to suggest that the Court’s legal analysis of compliance with the precautionary prin-
ciple was highly deferential.
This did not occur in Confédération Paysanne, where the Court was more proactive in its legal
examination. This request for a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation and validity of the
mutagenesis exemption under the 2001 Deliberate Release Directive. This Directive regulates the
environmental release of genetically engineered crops for field test or cultivation purposes, as well
as the placing on the market of genetically engineered seeds and products other than food and
feed. The term “mutagenesis” encompasses a range of genetic engineering techniques which have
considerably evolved in the twenty years since the enactment of the 2001 Directive.
Under Article 2(2) of the Directive, genetic modification occurs at least through the use of the
techniques listed in Annex I(A), part 1; the techniques listed in Annex I(A), part 2, on the other
hand, are not considered to result in genetic modification. Mutagenesis is listed in neither part of
the Annex. Pursuant to Article 3(1), the techniques of genetic modification listed in Annex I(B) do
not fall within the scope of application of the 2001 Directive. Mutagenesis is included in this
Annex. The applicant in the national proceedings lamented that organisms obtained through
95Id. at para. 48.
96Id. at para. 129.
97Id. at para. 138.
98Id. at para. 133.
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new mutagenesis techniques, unknown back in 2001, were exempted from the obligations laid
down in the French environmental code, which implements the 2001 Directive. Most importantly,
such organisms pose uncertain health and environmental risks which are comparable to the ones
posed by traditional GMOs, created through the application of transgenesis techniques.
By its first question, the referring court asked whether organisms created through “new”muta-
genesis techniques constituted genetically modified organisms within the meaning of Article 2.
Further, and crucially, it inquired whether Articles 2 and 3 as well as Annexes I(A) and I(B)
to the Directive should be interpreted as meaning that they exempt from the Directive’s environ-
mental risk assessment and traceability obligations all organisms obtained through mutagenesis,
or only organisms obtained through mutagenesis techniques known at the time the Directive was
adopted. Regarding the question of whether the Court should have confirmed the general appli-
cation of the mutagenesis exemption, the referring court inquired about these provisions’ com-
patibility with the precautionary principle.99
The applicants in the national case and the French government expressly suggested an inter-
pretation of the mutagenesis exemption in light of Recital (17) of the Directive and the precau-
tionary principle.100 According to Recital (17), the 2001 Directive “should not apply to organisms
obtained through certain techniques of genetic modification which have conventionally been used
in a number of applications and have a long safety record.”101 The precautionary principle, as
applicable to review of legislative acts and as already explained, postulates that scientific uncer-
tainty should be dispelled as much as possible and that the risk manager should have all relevant
scientific evidence available, with a view to establishing whether uncertain risks meet the intended
level of protection. Referring to the legal underpinning of Recital (17) and the overarching tenets
of the precautionary principle, the applicants and France thus argued that the mutagenesis exemp-
tion should not apply to organisms obtained through new mutagenesis techniques.
Advocate General Bobek took a diametrically opposite view. With respect to the first question,
he found that the text, historical context, and internal logic of the 2001 Directive did not support
the proposition that newmutagenesis techniques should not be exempted.102 On these grounds, he
concluded that “the precautionary principle cannot lead . . . to rewriting the provisions of the legal
text . . . contra legem,”103 adding that “it is certainly not the role of this Court to start judicially
rewriting definitions and categories.”104
Further, in his assessment of the potential invalidity of the mutagenesis exemption vis-à-vis the
precautionary principle,105 he also found that no legal elements lent support to the claim of a
breach of the precautionary principle. In this respect, he argued, no grounds could be identified
to substantiate the argument that absence of environmental risk assessment and traceability obli-
gations violated the precautionary principle.106 The Opinion underlines that scientific knowledge
as to the concrete risks posed by new mutagenesis techniques is very limited. However, reliance on
the precautionary principle presupposes that a risk cannot be purely hypothetical, but scientifi-
cally verified. On this basis, the Advocate General claimed that the precautionary principle could
not apply.107 Arguably, this is a circular argument. The Opinion suggests that the precautionary
principle is not at stake insofar as the uncertain risks posed by new mutagenesis techniques have
99Confédération Paysanne, Case C-528/16 at para. 25.
100See the reference to this point in Opinion of Advocate General Bobek at para. 87, Case C-528/16, Confédération
Paysanne v. Premier Ministre (Jan. 18, 2018).
101Deliberate Release Directive, recital (17) (emphasis added).
102Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, supra note 100, at para. 91. For the A.G.’s analysis and textual interpretation of the
Directive, see in particular paras. 80–85.
103Confédération Paysanne, Case C-528/16 at para. 103.
104See id. at paras. 89, 104.
105For the rather restrictive interpretation of the precautionary principle in the Opinion in this Case, see id. at para. 48–54.
106Id. at paras. 130, 143.
107Id. at paras. 146, 147.
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not been identified. Yet, the applicants lamented a breach of the precautionary principle in that the
absence of comprehensive risk assessments does not allow for the identification of any such
risks.108
In its ruling, the Court engaged in a teleological interpretation of the mutagenesis exemption in
light of Recital (17) and the precautionary principle. Upon remarking that new mutagenesis tech-
niques pose risks which are comparable to those posed by traditional genetic modification,109 it
went on to emphasize the role and value of the precautionary principle in the context of the 2001
Directive.110 It thus found that a restrictive interpretation of the mutagenesis exemption would fail
to take into consideration heed the intention of the legislator, as apparent from Recital (17), and
would “compromise the objective of protection pursued by the Directive and . . . fail to respect the
precautionary principle, which [the Directive] seeks to implement.”111 On these grounds, it did
not need to address the question on the validity of the mutagenesis exemption.
This case perfectly exemplifies the clash between judicial restraint, as apparent from the
Opinion of the Advocate General, and an interpretation of EU legislative acts in light of the pre-
cautionary principle. The Court’s ruling has been a most welcome addition to the debate in this
field. Yet, it is worth stressing that, unlike in Monsanto Italia, the Court had rather strong legal
elements to underpin its own teleological interpretation. From this perspective, the Court’s ruling
offers an example of balanced and legally informed interpretation in the context of judicial review
of compliance with the precautionary principle; it should neither be defined as a case of judicial
rewriting, nor as a case of judicial activism. Arguments in favor of judicial restraint in cases like
Confédération Paysanne, by contrast, appear to draw on a reluctance to acknowledge the status
and role of the precautionary principle as a general principle of EU law enshrined in the Treaties
and in legislation.
F. Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts (II): Blaise and The Question of Regulatory
Implementation
The Opinion of the Advocate General and the Judgment of the Court in Blaise provide a rather
concise overview of the institutional architecture underlying the Plant Protection Product (PPP)
Regulation.112 For this reason, a more thorough examination of the relevant governance arrange-
ments is necessary to fully grasp the rationale of the specific questions referred by the national
court and the issues surrounding the implementation of the Regulation.
The scope of application of the PPP Regulation encompasses active substances, safeners, syn-
ergists, co-formulants, adjuvants, and plant protection products (PPPs).113 The Regulation does
not provide a legal definition of “active substances.” Active substances, however, are scientifically
acknowledged to be the main active constituent(s) with pesticidal properties in a PPP, which is
commonly known as a pesticide. As clarified in the PPP Regulation and in relevant implementing
acts, active substances can be produced by different manufacturing processes, leading to
differences in specifications, metabolites, degradation products, and impurities; these differences
might have safety implications.114 Safeners are substances or preparations which are added to
108In other words, it is impossible to establish and prove any potential adverse effects if a risk has not been assessed in the
first place.
109Confédération Paysanne, Case C-528/16 at para. 48.
110Id. at paras. 49, 50.
111Id. at Para. 53.
112PPP Regulation, supra note 12.
113Id. at art. 3.
114See PPP Regulation, supra note 12, Recital (27), arts. 3(32), (33) for definitions of “metabolites” and “impurities.” See also
Commission Regulation 546/2011 of 10 June 2011 Implementing Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
1107/2009 as regards Uniform Principles for Evaluation and Authorization of Plant Protection Products, 2011 O.J. (L 155);
Commission Regulation 283/2013 of 1 March 2013 setting out the Data Requirements for Active Substances, in Accordance
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eliminate or reduce the phytotoxic effects of a PPP.115 Synergists have limited pesticidal properties
if any, but can give enhanced activity to the active substance(s) contained in a PPP.116 Finally, co-
formulants are used in a PPP or an adjuvant for purposes different from the ones of a safener or
synergist,117 whereas adjuvants are substances or preparations consisting of one or more co-for-
mulants and which are intended to be mixed with a PPP, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness
or its pesticidal properties.118
PPPs are made up of active substance(s) and a range of co-constituents, which may include
safeners, synergists, and other co-formulants. They can be formulated in many different ways,
as the specific co-constituents or their relative quantities in the final product may vary. Article
2(1) provides a list of their potential aims and uses, including protecting plants or plant products
against harmful organisms, influencing the life processes of plants, preserving plant products,
destroying undesired plants or parts of plants, and preventing undesired growth of plants. It is
estimated that around 500 different PPPs are authorized and marketed across the EU.119
Article 27 provides for the adoption of an EU negative list of co-formulants which shall not be
accepted for inclusion in a PPP. Co-formulants shall be banned at EU level where their use—con-
sequent on application consistent with good plant protection practice and having regard to real-
istic conditions of use—has harmful effects on human and animal health or unacceptable effects
on plants, products, or the environment. The same applies where their residues, under the same
conditions, have harmful effects on human and animal health or groundwater or unacceptable
effects on the environment.120 Active substances, safeners, and synergists are approved at EU level.
The same procedure121 and the same approval criteria apply to these three categories.122 The
multi-level procedural arrangements enshrined in the Regulation provide for a draft assessment
report by the Rapporteur Member State, namely the Member State which received the original
application for approval,123 and the engagement of the EFSA, which will adopt a final
Opinion. In the Opinion, the EFSA will draw its conclusions as to whether the active sub-
stance—or safener or synergist—can be expected to meet the approval criteria.124 The procedure
will then enter the Comitology stage, with the Commission submitting its proposed draft
Regulation to the relevant Committee.125 Conversely, specific PPPs in their different formulations
are authorized at Member State level and in the framework of the Regulation’s zone system.126
What is relevant for the purposes of the present inquiry, however, is rather an analysis of the
criteria for EU approval of active substances and for the authorization of PPPs at Member
State level, together with any relevant risk mitigation measures that EU or Member State author-
ities may attach to the approvals.
with Regulation 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards Uniform Principles for Evaluation and
Authorization of Plant Protection Products, 2013 O.J. (L 93).
115PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 2(3)(a).
116Id. at art. 2(3)(b).
117Id. at art. 2(3)(c).
118Id. at art. 2(3)(d).
119There are no official data on the exact number of PPPs authorized across the EU. For this estimate, see EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, (2018/2153 (INI)), at 14, pt. BU
(Dec. 18, 2018).
120PPP Regulation, supra note 12, art. 27(1)(a–b).
121See id. at arts. 5–13 for the approval procedure; id. at arts. 14–21 for the renewal of approval or review procedures.
122For active substances, see PPP Regulation, supra note 12, art. 4, Annex II. For safeners and synergists, see PPP
Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 25.
123PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at arts. 7–11.
124Id. at art. 12.
125Id. at arts. 13, 78–79. The criteria to be taken into account for the purposes of deciding whether to approve or not to
approve active substances are laid out in PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 13. For more details see Leonelli, The
Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of EU Risk Regulation, supra note 8.
126PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at arts. 28, 32.
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Starting from active substances, safeners, or synergists, points 3.6.2–3.6.4 and 3.7 of Annex
II to the PPP Regulation include the so-called “cut-off” hazard-based criteria for approval.127
An active substance may not be approved if it is classified as a mutagen 1A or 1B substance
under the CLP Regulation.128 Further, it may not be approved if it is classified as a carcinogen
1A or 1B129 or toxic for reproduction 1A or 1B substance under the same Regulation130 unless
exposure to the active substance in conditions of use of PPPs containing it is negligible and the
residues of the PPPs containing it are in accordance with the relevant Maximum Residue
Levels (MRLs).131 By this reference already, as will be explained in detail below, it is possible
to infer the partially overlapping nature of assessment of an active substance and assessment
of indicative uses of representative PPPs containing the active substance. Active substances
are not used on their own, but in formulations including co-constituents; different formula-
tions result in different PPPs. For this reason, any EU-wide assessment of the risks posed by an
active substance will, at least in part, be conducted by means of an assessment of the risks
posed by exposure to representative PPPs containing that active substance, or by their
residues.
Under the third “cut-off” criterion, an active substance may not be approved if it is con-
sidered to be a persistent organic pollutant (POP), persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic
(PBT), or a very persistent and very bioaccumulative (vPvB) substance.132 Turning to the fol-
lowing criteria, point 3.1 mandates that the applicant’s dossier should contain—where rel-
evant—an AOEL,133 acute reference dose, acceptable daily intake, and MRLs. These values
refer to representative PPPs containing the active substance; under point 3.6.1, they shall
be established with a safety margin of at least 100, or an increased one. Points 3.2–3.4 lay
out criteria for efficacy—of the active substance and representative PPPs—metabolites and
impurities. Further, point 3.6.5 specifies that an active substance may not be approved if it
has endocrine disrupting properties. But again, this is so unless exposure to the active sub-
stance in conditions of use of PPPs containing it is negligible and the residues of the PPPs
containing it comply with the MRLs.134 Finally, points 3.8–3.10 provide criteria on ecotoxi-
cology,135 residues, and groundwater.
Pursuant to point 3.5.3 of the Annex and Article 4(4) of the Regulation, in accordance with the
necessity to analyze the risks posed by active substances in light of exposure to PPP formulations
containing it, the evaluation of an active substance shall be carried out in accordance with the
principle for evaluation and authorization of PPPs at Member State level referred to in Article
127According to some accounts of EU governance of pesticides, the EU follows a “hazard-based” approach. These accounts
draw on the existence of hazard-based cut-off criteria to infer that the regulatory model is “hazard-based.” In fact, “risk” is a
function of the probability of occurrence of adverse effects and their severity as resulting from exposure to a hazard; clearly,
where substances are highly hazardous, risks are bound to increase. As detailed in this subsection, the hazard-based cut-off
criteria set a rebuttable presumption that, due to the highly hazardous properties of specific active substances, the relevant
risks will not meet the intended level of protection. Mutagen substances are an exception, as they are the most hazardous of all.
128PPP Regulation, supra note 12, Annex II, pt. 3.6.2 (referring to Regulation 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 December 2008, Classification, Labelling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures, Amending and
Repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and Amending Regulation 1907/2006, 2008 O.J. (L 353).
129PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at Annex II, pt. 3.6.3. See also PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 4(7), for a derogation.
130PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at Annex II, pt. 3.6.4. See also PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 4(7), for a derogation.
131Regulation 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005, Maximum Residue Levels of
Pesticides in or on Food and Feed of Plant and Animal Origin and Amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC, 2005 O.J.,(L 70).
132PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at Annex II, pt. 3.7.
133See supra, the analysis of Paraquat in Section D.
134PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at Annex II, pt. 3.6.5; A carcinogen 2 and toxic for reproduction 2 substance shall be
considered to have endocrine disrupting properties, whereas a toxic for reproduction 2 substance which has endocrine dis-
rupting organs may be considered to have endocrine disrupting properties. See also PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 4(7),
for a derogation.
135PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at Annex II, pt. 3.8. See also PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 4(7), for a derogation.
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29(6). These uniform principles are enshrined in Regulation 546/2011.136 The interlocking nature
of the two forms of assessment is further clarified by point 2.1 of the Annex and Article 4(5),
providing that the two approval criteria of Article 4 are complied with when authorization in
at least one Member State is expected to be possible for at least one PPP containing that active
substance for at least one representative use.
Under Article 4(3), read in conjunction with Annex II, an active substance shall be approved if
at least one PPP containing it, consequent on application consistent with good practice and having
regard to realistic conditions of use, meets five criteria.137 First, the PPP must be sufficiently effec-
tive. Second, it must have no immediate or delayed harmful effect on groundwater and on human
health, directly or indirectly, taking into account any cumulative and synergistic effects in accor-
dance with the EFSA’s guidelines on applicable scientific methods and protocols.138 In other
words, the uncertain risks posed by the interaction of active substances and co-constituents in
PPP formulations must be taken into consideration. Third, it shall not have any unacceptable
effects on plants or plant products. Fourth, it shall not cause unnecessary suffering to vertebrates.
Fifth, it shall not have any unacceptable effects on the environment. Under Article 4(2), read in
conjunction with Annex II, the residues of the PPP containing the active substance, consequent on
application consistent with good practice and having regard to realistic conditions of use, shall
neither have any harmful effects on human or animal health, taking into account any cumulative
and synergistic effects, nor any unacceptable effects on the environment.
This brief overview sheds some light on the highly complex evaluations underlying EU appro-
val of pesticidal active substances. EU risk assessments are meant to encompass the hazardous
properties of active substances, an analysis of their behavior when interacting with co-constituents
in representative PPPs, an examination of exposures to PPPs under realistic conditions for use as
well as the determination of relevant AOELs, ADIs, MRLs, and conditions for use. Both
Regulation 546/2011 and Regulation 283/2013 take a prudential approach to risk assessment,
requiring a comprehensive and in-depth examination and stressing that the relevant margins
of uncertainty should be taken into due consideration, both in the analysis of potential hazards
and in the evaluation of risk.139 However, as further explored in the following subsections, differ-
ent factors as well as multiple uncertainties come into play. The latter may relate to the identi-
fication and characterisation of specific hazards, insofar as a causal relationship between the
characteristics of a product and adverse effects may not have been scientifically established;
the hazards might be connected to the active substance, as such, or to the synergistic and cumu-
lative effects of its interaction with co-formulants in PPPs. Further, predicting exposure to PPPs,
the probability of occurrence of adverse effects, and their severity poses a plurality of challenges.
This is not only because of the inherent difficulties in predicting exposures in realistic conditions,
but also because of the varying availability and effectiveness of risk management measures—for
example, good practice in the use of PPPs or appropriate equipment. The latter element adds a
further layer of complexity in that it feeds into the determination that the AOELs or ADIs will be
met and that risks will be acceptable, influencing the approval decision.140
To conclude this first part of the overview, it is worth highlighting that conditions or restric-
tions may be attached to the approval of an active substance at EU level. Pursuant to Article 6,
these might relate inter alia to the minimum degree of purity or impurities of the active substance,
the types of preparation and formulation of PPPs, the conditions of application, the categories of
users, or the areas where PPPs containing the active substance may be used. Further, restrictions
136Commission Regulation 546/2011, supra note 114.
137PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 4(3)(a–e).
138These have now been adopted; see REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note
119, at 10.
139See Commission Regulation 546/2011, supra note 114; Commission Regulation 283/2013, supra note 114.
140See supra, the analysis of Paraquat in Section D.
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for use may be provided in case of specific agricultural, plant health, or environmental and cli-
matic conditions, and ad hoc risk mitigation and monitoring conditions may be attached.
These can, and should, be complemented by further conditions and restrictions adopted at
Member State level within the authorization of single and specific PPPs containing the active sub-
stance.141 National authorizations of PPPs shall define plants or plant products and the purposes
for which the PPP may be used, including non-agricultural areas on which it may be used and the
requirements relating to its placing on the market.142 Where applicable, the authorization shall
include the maximum dose per application and the maximum number of applications and rel-
evant timeframes; it may also list further restrictions or conditions.
In their risk assessment of specific PPPs, Member States should apply the uniform principles of
Regulation 546/2011 and focus on the hazards and specific risks posed by interaction between the
active substance, safeners, synergists, and co-formulants.143 Adjuvants, preparations to be mixed
with PPPs, are also authorized at Member State level.144
Article 29(1) provides a list of requirements to be met for authorization of specific PPPs,145
including that any PPP shall comply with the requirement of Article 4(3),146 that its formulation
is such that exposure or other risks are limited as much as technically possible,147 and that its
residues of toxicological, ecotoxicological, or environmental relevance can be determined and lim-
ited.148 All tests and analyses must be carried out under the agricultural, plant health, and envi-
ronmental—including climatic—conditions prevailing in the specific zone and Member State,
taking into account realistic conditions of use and proper use under Article 55.149 Indeed, the
allocation of responsibility for the authorization of specific PPPs to the Member States
responds—at least in part—to the principle of subsidiarity.150
Yet again, the PPP Regulation and implementing acts provide for a thorough and prudential
risk assessment of PPPs at Member State level. This is complemented by the express possibility for
Member States to resort to precautionary risk management, in the face of persisting uncertainty,
and to decide not to authorize PPPs, despite the prior approval of active substances at EU level.
Article 1(3) and 1(4) provide that the purpose of the PPP Regulation is to ensure a high level of
public health and environmental protection, and that the Regulation is underpinned by the pre-
cautionary principle. Article 1(4) expressly maintains that “Member States shall not be prevented
from applying the precautionary principle where there is scientific uncertainty as to the
risks . . . posed by the [PPPs] to be authorized in their territory.”151
This is reflected in the procedures of Articles 36 and 50. Pursuant to Article 36(2), Member States
shall grant or refuse authorizations on the grounds of the results of risk assessment; under Article
36(3), they may impose appropriate conditions or risk mitigation measures. Further, where a
141PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 31(2). At a minimum, the Member State Authorization Act shall include all con-
ditions established at EU level in the act approving the relevant active substances, safeners, and synergists.
142PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 31(1–2).
143Id. at art. 29(6). The data requirements for the applicants are laid out in Commission Regulation 284/2013 of 1 March
2013 Setting Out the Data Requirements for Plant Protection Products, in Accordance with Regulation 1107/2009 of the
European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Placing of Plant Protection Products on the Market, 2013 O.J.
(L 93). Regrettably, the harmonized guidelines on applicable scientific methods and protocols for the evaluation of PPPs
at Member State level, referenced in PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 29(4) are yet to be adopted by the EFSA; see
REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note 119, at 26, pt. 91.
144PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 58.
145For the full list, see the text of PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 29(1). Clearly, the relevant active substances, safe-
ners, and synergists must have been approved at EU level; the relevant co-formulants must have not been banned.
146PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 29(1)(e).
147Id. at art. 29(1)(d).
148Id. at art. 29(1)(g).
149PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 29(3). See also PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at arts. 36(1), 55.
150See PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at recital (23); see also, infra, Section F(II).
151PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 1(4).
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Member State has substantiated reasons to consider that a PPP—due to specific agricultural or envi-
ronmental circumstances—poses an unacceptable risk to human or animal health or the environ-
ment, which cannot be adequately controlled by the establishment of national risk mitigation
measures, it is entitled to refuse authorization.152 Moreover, Article 50(2) stipulates that Member
States may in exceptional cases refuse an authorization if a non-chemical control or prevention
method exists for the same use and is in general use in that Member State.153 The precautionary
principle and the principle that a high level of public health and environmental protection should
be pursued shine through these clauses. Additional safeguards are stipulated by Article 44—provid-
ing that authorizations may be reviewed, withdrawn, or amended at any time where the criteria of
Article 29 are no longer met—as well as Articles 69, 70, and 71, which all contain emergency
measures.
Against the overall backdrop of this overview, the next subsection analyzes the Advocate
General and the Court’s line of reasoning, explaining on which grounds the referring court raised
the issue of compliance with the precautionary principle in the framework of the PPP Regulation.
This is followed by an examination of the gap between regulation and regulatory implementation
in the field of pesticides, as developed in Subsection F(II). The analysis shows how the Court’s
ruling in Blaise did not, and in fact could not, do justice to the points raised by the parties in
the national proceedings.
I. Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts (II): Blaise
The national court referred four questions for a preliminary ruling, each of which surrounded the
PPP Regulation’s governance arrangements and their compliance with the precautionary princi-
ple. This reference arose in the context of criminal proceedings against a group of French anti-
genetically engineered organisms activists who had been charged with degrading or deteriorating
property after defacing containers of glyphosate-based herbicides. Thus, this reference is set
against the much broader background of the glyphosate re-approval controversy.154 As
Advocate General Sharpston noted in her preliminary considerations:
[T]he validity of provisions of EU law is to be assessed according to the characteristics of
those provision themselves and cannot depend on the particular circumstances of a given
case. . . . Unless concerns relating to glyphosate are shown to be representative of a systemic
and fundamental failure undermining the PPP Regulation [and its aims], they cannot place
in doubt the overall integrity of the prior approval system established by the Regulation.155
With this statement she drew some clear boundaries between issues pertaining to the PPP
Regulation’s governance arrangements, on the one hand, and issues relating to the implementa-
tion of the PPP Regulation in the specific case of glyphosate, on the other hand. However, the gap
between regulation and regulatory implementation permeates the entire case; in fact, as the next
subsection explains, this gap goes well beyond the specifics of glyphosate’s re-approval, which only
provided the setting for the reference by the national court.
152Id. at art. 36(3).
153The text of this Article is not totally clear, given that Article 50(1) on the comparative assessment procedure in case of
PPPs containing an active substance which is a candidate for substitution is broader in scope. Not only does it refer to non-
chemical alternatives, but also to any prior authorization of a significantly safer PPP which can fulfil the same function, and
does not present significant economic or practical disadvantages.
154For more information, see Leonelli, The Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of EU Risk Regulation,
supra note 8.
155Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston at para. 44, Case C-616/17, Blaise and Others (Mar. 12, 2019)
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After this introductory remark, she provided a very brief overview of the precautionary prin-
ciple’s application to judicial review,156 noting that the referring court did not “explain what it
understands to be the components of the principle or indicate to what extent that principle is
to be applied by the Court when considering whether an EU measure . . . is invalid.”157 The
Advocate General remarked that the PPP Regulation is in and of itself a precautionary measure,
in that it establishes a system of prior approval for pesticidal products, and that it is underpinned
by the precautionary principle. Thus, the measures adopted under it should be based on the pre-
cautionary principle.158 However, she also noted that a correct application of the precautionary
principle postulates an identification of potential adverse effects as well as a comprehensive risk
assessment.159 To elaborate further, and as explained above, the risk assessment provided for
under EU legislative acts should be robust enough to enable risk managers to exercise their dis-
cretion and adopt precautionary risk management measures where scientific uncertainty persists
and uncertain risks might not comply with the intended level of protection. Against this backdrop,
the Advocate General summarized the four questions of the national court by noting that all of
them point to “generic failures in the overall system of risk assessment of [PPPs, insofar as] the
assessment is insufficiently comprehensive (Questions 1, 3 and 4) or independent and transparent
(Question 2).”160
The Opinion and the Judgment frame the question of compliance with the precautionary prin-
ciple in terms of whether the EU legislator, by enacting legislative provisions in breach of the
precautionary principle, incurred a manifest error of assessment.161 As already explained in
Section C, this test does not quite do justice to review of compliance with the precautionary prin-
ciple in cases where acts are challenged for not being protective enough. In these cases, the precau-
tionary principle should be framed as an inner limit to administrative or political discretion.
However, in the context of the present analysis, it is worth mentioning that the Advocate
General and Court’s choice to focus on whether the PPP Regulation arrangements are vitiated
by a manifest error did not influence the examination of the relevant provisions or the outcome
of the ruling.
By its first question, the national court inquired whether the PPP Regulation is compatible with
the precautionary principle insofar as it provides no specific definition of an active substance,
leaving it to the applicant to determine what it designates as the relevant active substance whereas
PPPs placed on the market are made up of several co-constituents. By its third, somewhat oddly
framed question, the referring court ultimately asked whether the PPP Regulation is compatible
with the precautionary principle when it provides for EU approval of active substances and takes
no account of the presence of co-constituents in PPPs. These questions point to the multi-level
dynamics underlying the regulatory framework. By its questions, the referring court meant to
inquire whether the bifurcated system of the PPP Regulation enables the relevant authorities
to take into due consideration the potential interaction of active substances and co-constituents
in different PPP formulations.
In the first respect, the Advocate General found that, under Article 2(2), any substance having
“general or specific action against harmful organisms or on plants, parts of plants or plant prod-
ucts” is considered an active substance subject to the data requirements of Regulation 283/2013
and approval conditions of the PPP Regulation.162 In scientific terms, as already explained, active
156This part of the Opinion, for instance, does not reference Monsanto Italia–the only case before Blaise where the Court
examined compliance with the precautionary principle of a legislative act indirectly challenged for being insufficiently
protective.
157Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at para. 47.
158Id. at paras. 44, 50.
159Id. at para. 48; see also Judgement at paras. 46, 47.
160Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at para. 51.
161Id. at paras. 50, 51, 52.
162Id. at para. 55.
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substances are acknowledged to be the main pesticidal components of a PPP, as distinguished
from any potential co-constituents. Further criteria for their identification are laid out in the
Annex to Regulation 283/2013. The Court adhered to the Opinion.163 In the second respect, draw-
ing on the relevant legislative provisions,164 both the Advocate General and the Court found that
the PPP Regulation requires the potential effects of interacting co-constituents in PPP formula-
tions to be taken into account both at EU level—in the procedure for authorization of active sub-
stances—and at Member State level, in the national procedure for authorization of PPPs
containing that active substance.165 The Court noted that “it is inherent in [the assessment of
an active substance at EU level] that [such assessment] cannot be carried out in an objective fash-
ion while failing to take into account the effects derived from a possible combination of various
constituents of a [PPP].”166 As explained earlier in Section F, active substances are not used on
their own, but in PPPs containing other co-constituents. For this reason, when assessing the risks
of an active substance, the relevant authorities must also take into account representative PPPs
containing that active substance. The opposite would not make any sense in scientific terms.
On these grounds, the Court concluded that no manifest errors could be identified.
By its second question, which is partly relevant for the purposes of the present analysis, the
national court inquired whether the precautionary principle is observed and impartiality main-
tained when the relevant scientific tests are conducted by the applicants alone, without any in-
dependent counter-analysis.167 This question is clearly set against the broader backdrop of the
glyphosate saga. Notably, the controversies arising from excessive reliance by the national com-
petent authority in the Rapporteur Member State on data provided in the applicant’s dossier, the
“Monsanto Papers” scandal, allegations of conflict of interest and lack of transparency within the
EFSA, and the request by the Stop Glyphosate European Citizens Initiative to provide that sci-
entific tests, studies, and analyses should not be conducted or provided by market applicants but
instead by regulatory agencies.168
The regulatory presumption that a product or process should be deemed unsafe until market
applicants have proven that it is safe enough for its risks to comply with the EU intended level of
protection is encoded in the DNA of EU risk regulation;169 so is the presumption that the scientific
burden of proof rests with the market applicants.170 While this is by no means an ideal scenario,
insofar as information asymmetries may surface and scientific data may be manipulated by market
applicants, it responds to administrative and economic needs. Most importantly, it reflects the
principle that market applicants who will economically profit from the authorization of a product
should bear the economic costs associated with the authorization procedure and have responsibil-
ity for producing the relevant scientific evidence.171 On these grounds, the relevant question is
rather whether sufficient procedural safeguards, notably adequate research, reliance on broader
peer reviewed studies, and an independent counter-analysis by regulatory agencies, are in place.
163See the more detailed examination in the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at paras 52–61.
164PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 4(1–5), 4(2,3), 29(6), 25, & 27.
165Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at paras. 56–61, 62–76.
166Id. at paras. 68.
167This question included reference to whether the precautionary principle is complied with in the absence of publication of
the application dossiers “on the pretext of protecting industrial secrecy.” This aspect is not taken into consideration, as it is
unrelated to the analysis of compliance with the precautionary principle; in other words, it is irrelevant to the question whether
the risk manager is endowed with all information necessary to enact precautionary risk management measures. Rather, this
part of the question touches upon matters of transparency and access to documents.
168For more information, see Leonelli, The Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of EU risk Regulation,
supra note 8.
169Id.
170See, e.g., Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 14, at 20, § 6.4. See PPP Regulation,
supra note 12, at arts. 7(1), 29(2).
171Commission on the European Citizens’ Initiative Ban Glyphosate and Protect the People and the Environment from Toxic
Pesticide, at 10, § 3.2, COM (2017) 8414 final (Dec. 12, 2017).
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The independence and accountability of regulatory agencies and the transparency of the risk
assessment process also come into play.
The Advocate General found in her Opinion that “if the rules are followed, [scientific data pro-
vided under the PPP Regulation] will be of a certain standard set by that Regulation and its related
secondary legislation.”172 The Court took a similar perspective. Tests and analyses must be con-
ducted according to the rules on good laboratory practice, as provided for under the Good
Laboratory Practice Regulation;173 further specifications are laid out in the PPP Regulation.174
Specific data requirements for both active substances and PPPs are enshrined in the 2013
Regulations,175 and further guidelines on scientific methods and protocols for the evaluation
of active substances have been adopted by the EFSA. Scientific, peer-reviewed literature must also
be adduced by the applicants and reviewed by the agencies.176 Where the relevant agencies are not
satisfied that the data is sufficient to grant approval or an authorization, they are under an obli-
gation to request additional information.177 Further, the involvement and engagement of different
agencies across the EU, in accordance with the multi-level arrangements of the PPP Regulation,
acts as a safeguard by enabling different authorities to review the relevant data.178 In light of this
examination, both the Advocate General and the Court concluded that the PPP Regulation is not
vitiated by a manifest error of assessment in this respect.
Finally, by its last question, the national court asked whether the PPP Regulation is compatible
with the precautionary principle insofar as it exempts from toxicity tests—genotoxicity, carcino-
genicity, and endocrine disruption effects—PPPs authorized at the national level. These tests are
required for the purposes of authorizations of active substances;179 however, no such obligation is
in place for the purposes of national authorizations of PPPs. In her Opinion, the Advocate General
stressed that under Regulation 284/2013, national authorities have the express power to request
additional data, including toxicity studies. On these grounds, she ultimately concluded that no
manifest error of assessment could be identified in the regulatory arrangements.180 In a slightly
different way, the Court emphasized that under Articles 4(3)(b) and 29(1)(e), a PPP can only be
authorized if it has no immediate or delayed harmful effects. This presupposes that the national
authorities must exclude any toxic effects prior to authorization.181 It thus concluded that the
examination of the questions referred had not revealed elements capable of affecting the validity
of the PPP Regulation.
Against this overall backdrop, the next section explores the gap between regulation and regu-
latory implementation which lies at the heart of Blaise and the questions referred by the national
172Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at para. 64 (emphasis added). See also Opinion of Advocate
General Sharpston, supra note 155, at para. 69:
. . . [T]he system of structured assessment at EU and Member State levels laid down by the PPP Regulation is both
appropriate and sufficient to achieve the high level of environmental and human health protection sought. If cor-
rectly applied, that regulatory system will generate a comprehensive risk assessment that can be relied upon by the
competent authorities to justify adopting precautionary measures where appropriate.
173Directive 2004/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004, Harmonization of Laws,
Regulations, and Administrative Provisions relating to the Application of the Principles of Good Laboratory Practice and
the Verification of their Applications for tests on Chemical Substances, 2004 O.J. (L 50).
174See PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 8.1, Annex I, 29(3), as noted in Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra
note 155, at paras. 82–85.
175See Annexes to Commission Regulation 283/2013 & 284/2013, pt. 3, supra notes 114 & 143, as also noted in the Opinion
of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at para. 87.
176As stipulated by PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 8(5); see Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155,
at paras. 65, 89, 93–94.
177See PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at art. 11(3), 12(3), 37(1), as noted in Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra
note 155, at para. 92.
178See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at paras. 66–68, 96–98.
179See PPP Regulation, supra note 12, at Annex I; Commission Regulation 283/2013, supra note 114, at § 5.
180Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at para. 79.
181Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, supra note 155, at paras. 113–16.
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court. In this context, and with a particular focus on the multi-level risk assessment of active sub-
stances and PPPs, it explains how the Court did not—and in fact could not—judicially review the
problematic aspects underlying the PPP Regulation’s governance arrangements in light of the pre-
cautionary principle.
II. Judicial Review of EU Legislative Acts (II): The Gap Between Regulation and Regulatory
Implementation in Blaise and the Inadequacy of the PPP Regulation Arrangements. Active
Substances and PPPs
Were the referring court’s questions on compliance with the precautionary principle, as referred
by the national court in Blaise, so easy to answer? Admittedly, they were not. In fact, some prob-
lematic aspects surrounding the implementation of the multi-level arrangements enshrined in the
PPP Regulation, the comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the risk assessments conducted to
approve active substances and authorize PPPs, and their ability to inform the knowledge of risk
managers with a view to enabling precautionary risk management, can be easily identified.
The imperfect balance between EU assessment and approval of active substances, on the one
hand, and partially overlapping Member State assessments and authorizations of PPPs, on the other
hand, is ultimately based on the need to distribute authority and share technical-scientific and
administrative burdens. Subsidiarity plays a role in the allocation of responsibility for authorizing
PPPs at Member State level. The agricultural, plant health, and environmental-climatic conditions
prevailing in the specific zone and Member State, taking into account realistic conditions of use and
proper use, must be duly evaluated for the purposes of deciding whether a PPP should be authorized
and whether further risk mitigation measures should be put in place. However, acknowledging that
Member States should have the final word on authorizations of PPPs on their territory does not
necessarily mean that they should be in charge for their risk assessment.182 In terms of regulatory
implementation, the bifurcated system of the PPP Regulation poses a plurality of challenges.
The EU level conducts some form of preliminary or indicative evaluation of the risks posed by
exposure to active substances as contained in representative PPP formulations; this can by no means
provide an exhaustive risk assessment of all cumulative and synergistic effects for each and every
PPP containing that active substance which will be placed on the market. On the one hand, EU
assessments of active substances are not limited to an evaluation of the risks associated with the
single and specific substance. As explained in Section F, they do encompass an analysis of the risks
posed by the use or residues of PPP formulations containing it. On the other hand, it is fair to stress
that these assessments do not give the full picture of the public health and environmental risks posed
by different pesticidal products containing the active substance, as the specific co-constituents or
their relative quantities may vary in every PPP. Indeed, if the opposite were the case, there would
be no reason to provide for risk assessment of PPPs at Member State level.
In other words, EU assessments provide an indication that pesticides containing an active sub-
stance should be safe. The detailed assessment of the specific pesticidal formulations will then be
conducted at Member State level. From this perspective, the distinction between risk assessment of
active substances as contained in PPPs and risk assessment of PPPs is somewhat artificial. More
importantly, the determination that an active substance should be safe, even though it might not
always be so in specific pesticidal products, is problematic. Arguably, this is what the referring
court suggested in its first and third questions.
Further, it is worth stressing again that multiple uncertainties come into play in the field of pes-
ticides. As briefly mentioned in Section F, several uncertainties surface in the evaluation and char-
acterisation of risks. Uncertainty may arise because of the inherent difficulties in predicting exposure
in realistic conditions. The availability and effectiveness of risk mitigation measures—for instance
good practice in the use of PPPs, or appropriate equipment—will also influence the risks that
182On this point, see infra, the discussion later in this subsection.
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pesticidal formulations pose in practice. In this context, the identification and determination of pub-
lic health and environmental hazards by means of a partial analysis of synergistic and cumulative
effects of active substances and co-constituents at EU level adds up to this complex picture.
Indeed, a 2018 Report of the European Parliament makes three very important points in this
respect. First, it expressly calls on the Commission to ensure that active substances are assessed on
the basis of the most frequent relevant uses, PPP formulations, dosages, and exposure scenarios.183
Second, it recommends that an extra safety factor should be applied when calculating the AOELs
to address the potential toxicity of mixtures in PPP formulations.184 Third, it remarks that the
“harmful” and “unacceptable” effects provided for under Article 4(2) and (3) should be deter-
mined by taking into account real-life exposure to multiple PPPs.185 This last point is addressed
in greater detail below.
Can the partially overlapping risk assessment of PPPs at Member State level remedy this gap,
giving a full picture of the risks posed by single PPP formulations and thus enabling national risk
managers to enact precautionary measures and pursue a high level of protection? Overall, it does
not look like this is the case. Regulatory and institutional capacity is inferior at the national level,
and divergences between Member States can be significant in this respect. The European
Parliament Special Committee on the Union’s authorization procedure for pesticides has
lamented that national competent authorities are under-staffed and under-funded.186 On these
grounds, if something has slipped through the cracks of the preliminary evaluation at EU level,
it is highly likely that it will also slip through the cracks at Member State level. Further, the
European Parliament has identified a plurality of shortcomings in risk assessments conducted
at Member State level. First, and most worryingly, national authorities excessively rely on EU risk
assessments of the relevant active substances for the purposes of reaching their conclusions on
PPPs containing these active substances, extrapolating data from the EFSA’s conclusions.187
Highly hazardous pesticides may then be marketed on the grounds of a preliminary EU assess-
ment of the behavior of an active substance in pesticides and an insufficient national assessment of
individual PPPs. Second, national risk assessments of PPPs too often fail to take account of real-
istic conditions of use and exposure.188 As explained above, this generates a number of highly
relevant uncertainty factors. Third, as the defendants in the national proceedings in Blaise rightly
remarked, no obligation for an assessment of the long-term toxicity of PPPs is laid out in
Regulation 284/2013.189 The Report calls on the Commission to remedy this situation.190
On these grounds, in practical terms, the problems associated with the implementation of the
PPP Regulation may not enable EU or national risk managers to take adequately informed deci-
sions, pursuing a high level of protection and resorting to the precautionary principle where
recourse to it is warranted. Risk assessment of pesticidal formulations, at the EU as well as at
the national level, is thus not comprehensive enough to do justice to a correct application of
the precautionary principle. In fact, issues of risk management and risk mitigation make this pic-
ture even more complex. These elements include the reluctance of national authorities to
183REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note 119, at 21.
184Id. at 23.
185Id. at 24.
186Id. at 7,14. On this matter, see also European Parliament Resolution of 13 September 2018 on the Implementation of the
Plant Protection Products Regulation 1107/2009, (2017/2128(INI)) pt. 38.
187REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note 119, at 14, 26.
188Id. at 14.
189Id. at 15.
190Id, at 22. This situation is exacerbated by further problematic aspects, which, however, are unrelated to the issues at stake
in Blaise. First, the Commission is yet to adopt a list of approved safeners and synergists; on this point, see also REPORT ON THE
UNION’S AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note 119, at 15, 25. Second, the EU has not yet adopted a list of
banned co-formulants; the relevant consultations only closed in February 2020, and the Commission Regulation is still in draft
form. Third, as mentioned supra in note 143, harmonized guidelines on methods and protocols for the evaluation of PPPs at
Member State level are yet to be adopted by the European Food Saftey Authority (EFSA).
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supplement the risk mitigation measures provided for in the EU approval of active substances,191
the limited implementation and limited effectiveness of risk mitigation measures at Member State
level,192 and the patchy implementation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive.193 The latter
enshrines a set of obligations relating to risk management; these encompass risk reduction strat-
egies through raising information and awareness, requirements for the sale of pesticides, inspec-
tions on pesticide application equipment, limitations on specific application practices, the
enactment of National Action Plans and quantitative pesticide use or risk reduction targets,
and the promotion of integrated pest management.194 All of these measures aim at limiting expo-
sure and managing risks posed by single PPPs as well as multiple PPPs. Implementation at the
national level has been poor, particularly in the areas involving management of the risks posed
by multiple PPPs.195 Indeed, the Stop Glyphosate ECI called on the Commission to adopt binding
pesticide use reduction targets.196
Against this overall backdrop, we can conclude that EU governance of pesticides does not
always live up to the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle. The implementation of
the regulatory arrangements for risk assessment of PPPs, as laid out in the PPP Regulation, does
not always comply with the precautionary principle. As clearly shown in this section, the imple-
mentation of this system may not provide an exhaustive assessment of the relevant risks, enabling
precautionary risk management. This sheds some light on the interplay of complex regulatory
arrangements and their implementation across different territorial levels; in other words, the
analysis of the PPP Regulation shows the gap between the provisions of a regulatory framework
and their implementation.
The implementation of a legislative framework and its relationship to precautionary risk man-
agement, however, is neither a matter of law nor an object of judicial review. Clearly, the
differences between regulatory and legislative acts and the different form of scrutiny conducted
by the Court come into play. Questions of regulatory implementation in a challenge against a
legislative act are by necessity exempt from review of compliance with the precautionary principle,
or any other principle. This holds true for the defendants’ claims on lack of transparency of the
risk assessment process as well.197 The gap between law and policy cannot be bridged.
InMonsanto Italia and Confédération Paysanne, the referring courts raised legal questions sur-
rounding legal provisions on the preconditions for a risk assessment and the scope of application
of a legislative act. The connection between the specific legislative arrangements and the questions
on their compliance with the precautionary principle was also quite direct. In a different vein, the
national court in Blaise ultimately pointed to an implementation failure. As illustrated in this sec-
tion, this implementation failure goes well beyond the specific circumstances of glyphosate’s re-
approval. The Court, however, did not have any legal underpinnings to find that the PPP
Regulation’s legal arrangements are insufficient to allow for precautionary risk management.
191REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note 119, at 14, 25. For this reason, the
Report calls on the Commission to set stringent risk mitigation measures when approving active substances.
192REPORT ON THE UNION’S AUTHORISATION PROCEDURE FOR PESTICIDES, supra note 119, at 9.
193Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 Establishing a Framework for
Community Action to Achieve the Sustainable Use of Pesticides, 2009 O.J. (L 309) 1.
194See respectively, id. at arts. 5, 7, 6, 8, 9–13, 4, 15, 16, 14.
195See Report on the Implementation of Directive 2009/128/EC on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides, (2017/2284 (INI)), at
12–14 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2019-0045_EN.html.
196The Commission refused. For more details, see Leonelli, The Glyphosate Saga and the Fading Democratic Legitimacy of
EU Risk Regulation, supra note 8. It was only in 2019 that the EU harmonized indicators on the risks posed by different active
substances were adopted; see Commission Directive 2019/782 of 15 May 2019 Amending Directive 2009/128/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Establishment of Harmonised Risk Indicators, 2019 O.J. (L 127) 4.
197This has been partially remedied by the provisions enshrined in Regulation 1381/2019 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 20 June 2019 on the Transparency and Sustainability of the EU Risk Assessment in the Food Chain and
Amending Regulations (EC) 178/2002, (EC)1829/2003, (EC) 1831/2003, (EC) 2065/2003, (EC) 1935/2004, (EC) 1331/
2008, (EC) 1107/2009, (EU) 2015/2283, and Directive 2001/18/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 231) 1.
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As a matter of law, the Regulation complies with the precautionary principle. Issues of implemen-
tation and questions surrounding the distribution of authority between the EU and Member State
level will then have to be dealt with in political fora. As the Advocate General noted in the post-
script to her opinion, it will be open to political institutions to improve regulatory frameworks
through the legislative process.198
G. Conclusions: Mixed Results and the True Nature of the Precautionary Principle
This Article has analyzed judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle, taking
into consideration direct and indirect challenges to regulatory as well as legislative acts. Section B
framed the precautionary principle as an inner limit to the EU risk manager’s and legislator’s
broad administrative discretion. This Article has put forward this argument by contextualizing
recourse to the precautionary principle against the more encompassing backdrop of socially
acceptable risk approaches. Section C illustrated the challenges associated with judicial review
of compliance with the precautionary principle.
Building on this overview, Section D analyzed challenges involving regulatory acts, arguing that
the Court has followed a quantitative threshold approach. This is legally tenable and appropriate.
Through this quantitative threshold approach, the Court has drawn some boundaries between
judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle, on the one hand, and an acknowl-
edgment of the risk manager’s discretion in complying with the precautionary principle, on the
other hand. However, as also noted above, this approach cannot do justice to the true nature
of the precautionary principle. Normative and political contestation as to whether uncertain risks
are socially acceptable and worth running lie at the heart of principle; yet, the Court will refrain
from engaging with this aspect. This is the slippery slope of the precautionary principle that the
Court has carefully—and understandably—avoided.
Sections E and F turned to an analysis of preliminary rulings on the validity of EU legislative
acts. In the first case under analysis, Monsanto Italia, the Court ultimately hesitated to intrude in
the prerogative sphere of action of the legislator; it refrained from thoroughly scrutinizing whether
the procedural arrangements underlying the old system for governance of genetically engineered
organisms did not comply with the precautionary principle, leaving it to the EU legislator to
rework the regulatory framework. In the second case, Confédération Paysanne, the Court was
more proactive. It provided a teleological interpretation of the 2001 Directive on the
Deliberate Release of genetically engineered organisms, interpreting its provisions in light of
the precautionary principle, and thus avoiding an examination of the alleged invalidity of the
mutagenesis exemption. Nonetheless, it is worth underlining that the Court had a set of legal ele-
ments available to underpin and substantiate its own interpretation. Finally, in Blaise, issues of
regulatory implementation were more salient than regulatory matters. The Court limited its scru-
tiny to matters of law, concluding that the Regulation complies with the precautionary principle;
nor could it do otherwise.
All in all, it would be excessive to say that the Court has been reluctant to review legislative acts
in the field of EU risk regulation. However, the Court will find that a legislative act is in breach of
the precautionary principle only where it has robust legal elements to draw this conclusion. In this
sense, the Court has suggested that issues pertaining to procedural regulatory arrangements, the
scope of risk assessment, or the distribution of regulatory authority should be primarily dealt with
198See Blaise, Case C-616/17 at paras. 82, 83. Indeed, the 2018 Report of the European Parliament expressly calls on the
Commission to consider whether the EFSA should be responsible for risk assessment of PPPs, while clarifying that risk man-
agement and decisions on authorization should still rest with Member States. Indeed, it is worth underlining that respon-
sibility for risk assessment of PPPs could be shared between Member States, within the existing zonal system, and the
EFSA. This would mirror the existing EU-wide arrangements for approval of active substances; further, it would incorporate
the specific agricultural, plant health, and environmental-climatic conditions within the relevant assessments.
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by the EU legislator and solved in the political arena. Ultimately, it will fall on the EU legislator to
amend or improve regulatory frameworks.
Against this overall backdrop, judicial review in cases where the precautionary principle has
been used as a sword is fraught with difficulties and has yielded mixed results. Qualitative dis-
agreements on the threshold of acceptable risk will have to be solved in the political arena. In
this sense, the inner limits to the exercise of the risk manager’s broad administrative discretion
are quite thin. Equally, several obstacles to the Court’s examination in cases involving legislative
arrangements may surface, limiting the chances for a legal finding that they are in breach of the
precautionary principle. All of these legal difficulties are inherent to the nature of the principle.
On these grounds, it is fair to conclude that only regulatory applications, normative contest-
ation as to the determination of the threshold of acceptable risk and political and societal debate on
the adequacy of legislative frameworks will truly do justice to the precautionary principle. A
socially acceptable risk is reflected in the institutional architecture of EU governance and encoded
in the DNA of EU risk regulation. Yet, it will ultimately rest on EU risk managers and EU legis-
lators to ensure that the overarching goals of the precautionary principle are pursued. While the
principle has legal relevance for the purposes of judicial review, the Court cannot be expected to
fill the vacuum of regulatory authority.
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